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THREE DISCOUNT WINDOWS
Kathryn Judge †

It is widely assumed that the Federal Reserve is the lender of last resort
in the United States and that the Fed’s discount window is the primary mechanism through which it fulfills this role. Yet, when banks faced liquidity
constraints during the 2007–2009 financial crisis (the Crisis), the discount
window played a relatively small role in providing banks much needed liquidity. This is not because banks forewent government-backed liquidity;
rather, they sought it elsewhere. First, they increased their reliance on collateralized loans, known as advances, from the Federal Home Loan Bank
System, a little-known government-sponsored enterprise that grew in size to
over $1 trillion during the Crisis. Second, distressed banks offered exceptionally high interest rates on insured deposits, enabling them to retain and attract funds from depositors. As a result, Federal Home Loan Bank advances
and insured deposits served as “alternative discount windows,” standing
sources of government-backed liquidity that banks relied on as market conditions deteriorated.
In addition to drawing attention to the important and largely overlooked role that the alternative discount windows played during the Crisis,
this Article considers the normative implications of banks’ capacity to obtain
government-backed liquidity without going to the Federal Reserve. The analysis reveals both benefits and costs. As a result of the changing nature of
banking and financial intermediation, the Fed’s discount window alone
cannot meet the liquidity needs of a modern financial system in distress. By
facilitating the transfer of additional liquidity to the market during crisis
periods, the alternative discount windows may reduce the adverse systemic
consequences that arise from liquidity shortages. Yet, there are also significant costs. In contrast to the Fed, the Federal Home Loan Banks and insured depositors lack the incentives and competence needed to understand the
systemic consequences of their actions. As a result, the provision of liquidity
through the alternative discount windows tends to facilitate inefficient risk
taking, increase moral hazard, reduce regulatory accountability, and compromise information generation, in addition to adversely affecting healthy
banks. This Article accordingly concludes by proposing ways to reform the
underlying programs to reduce the costs of having alternative discount
windows.
† Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. The author would like to thank
participants at the International Financial Regulation Workshop sponsored by Berkeley
Law School, the Third Annual ETH-NYU Law & Banking/Finance Conference in Zurich,
Switzerland, and the Columbia Law School Faculty Lunch Series for helpful comments on
earlier drafts. Paul Jindra, Sara Margolis, and Arthi Sridharan provided excellent research
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
A core function of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) is to
promote financial stability, and a primary way that the Fed furthers
this aim is by acting as the lender of last resort. Until the 2007–2009
financial crisis (the Crisis), the Fed carried out this role through its
discount window (the Discount Window), a standing program that enables banks to borrow from the Fed so long as they can provide adequate collateral and meet other requirements.1 By providing liquidity
to banks in need of it, the Discount Window helps banks avoid
value-destroying fire sales and can calm financial panics.2
Nonetheless, a close look at where banks sought liquidity during the
early stages of the Crisis reveals that the Discount Window played a
surprisingly minor role in meeting banks’ liquidity needs.3 This was
true even though the Fed actively encouraged banks to borrow
through it.4 This was not, however, because banks forewent government-backed liquidity. Instead, they sought it elsewhere.
First and foremost, banks obtained liquidity in the form of advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) system, a
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) created to promote home
ownership by facilitating the issuance of reasonably priced mortgages.5 Second, banks facing financial distress offered exceptionally
high interest rates on insured deposits, thus using the lure of
government-backed insurance to retain and attract funds from consumers and other investors.6 FHLBank advances and insured deposits
thus functioned as “alternative discount windows”—standing facilities
through which banks could access government-backed liquidity when
market sources ran dry.
The alternative discount windows identified here were not intended to function as lenders of last resort. They came to this role as
a result of congressional inadvertence, market evolution, and bank
opportunism. Nonetheless, there are some benefits to having alternative discount windows. Lack of liquidity can have devastating effects
1
There are three programs that collectively constitute the Fed’s standing liquidity
facilities. The focus here is on the primary window. See infra Part I.C.
2
This Article focuses on U.S. banks. The issues here are not unique to U.S. banks as
foreign banks can access each of the sources of liquidity here at issue. Nonetheless, the
degree to which banks can utilize the alternative discount windows depends on the nature
and extent of their U.S. operations, imposing practical limits on their access and changing
the analysis in qualitatively significant ways. See VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., FED. RESERVE
BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 623, HOW DO GLOBAL BANKS SCRAMBLE FOR LIQUIDITY?
EVIDENCE FROM THE ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER FREEZE OF 2007, at 3 (2013), available
at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr623.pdf.
3
See infra Part II.A.
4
See id.
5
See infra Part II.A.I.
6
See infra Part II.A.2.
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on banks and on the economy more generally, and there are limits in
the capacity of the Discount Window to meet the liquidity needs of a
modern financial system in distress.7 The perceived stigma associated
with borrowing through the Discount Window, for example, may discourage a bank from using it even when doing so would benefit both
the bank and the financial system.8 Similarly, the changing nature of
banking and the rise of the “shadow banking system” give rise to liquidity constraints that the Discount Window is not well suited to address.9 By providing additional mechanisms for infusing liquidity into
a financial system in need of it, the alternative discount windows may
help to mitigate the adverse consequences that would otherwise
result.
Yet there are real costs and other challenges arising from the operation of the alternative discount windows. The parties providing liquidity through these mechanisms have neither the incentives nor the
means to ensure that they provide liquidity only to financially healthy
institutions. This significantly increases the probability that they will
provide funds to troubled banks that have an incentive to use the
funds to extend excessively high-risk loans and engage in other socially wasteful behavior. The empirical evidence supports this concern, revealing that during the Crisis and earlier periods of distress,
financially troubled banks were more likely than others to rely on
each of the alternative discount windows.10 Similarly, access to the
alternative discount windows increases moral hazard, reducing banks’
incentives to maintain adequate liquidity. The existence of the alternative discount windows also reduces the quality of the information
generated by Discount Window borrowing and limits the Fed’s capacity to impose potentially useful lending conditions, such as demanding additional information about a bank’s financial health and risk
exposures. A distinct consequence of banks’ ability to access
government-backed liquidity without going to the Fed is reduced
transparency and regulatory accountability. This may be particularly
important in light of increased public concern about the capacity of
lender-of-last-resort support to shield banks from the full consequences of their actions and otherwise engender moral hazard.11 For
these and other reasons, allowing the alternative discount windows to
persist in their current form is likely suboptimal, and this Article suggests some reforms to improve the situation.

7
8
9
10
11

See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
id.
infra
infra

Part IV.A.
Part IV.A.2.
Part IV.B.1.
Part V.B.
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This Article’s primary contribution is in drawing attention to the
important and largely overlooked role that the alternative discount
windows play in providing banks access to liquidity during periods of
distress, analyzing the effects of their operation, and proposing appropriate reforms. However, in the process of assessing the significance
of having alternative discount windows, this Article also draws attention to the need for further examination of the Fed’s activities and
prevailing norms regarding when and to whom a modern lender of
last resort should lend. The analysis here reveals significant shortcomings in the capacity of the Discount Window to respond to the liquidity constraints that can arise—and pose systemic risks—in today’s
financial markets. The Fed recognized many of these shortcomings
during the Crisis, and it responded by instituting a number of temporary facilities outside of the Discount Window that provided liquidity
to banks and other types of financial institutions.12 Like the alternative discount windows, these facilities fulfilled the short-term aim of
transferring additional liquidity to the market, but they too deviated
from certain longstanding norms about when, to whom, and how a
lender of last resort should lend. The Fed’s decisions to create these
facilities is directly relevant to the analysis here in that they affirm the
shortcomings of the Discount Window and the value of having additional mechanisms for transferring liquidity into the market. At the
same time, in assessing the effects of having alternative discount windows, this Article sheds additional light on the trade-offs inherent in
the Fed’s creation of these temporary facilities. In so doing, it illustrates the need for further consideration of the norms that should
guide a modern-day lender of last resort and the implications of the
Fed’s actions.
A few notes about this Article’s scope: First, the Article focuses on
discount windows, that is, standing programs through which a bank
facing a liquidity shortage may, at its discretion, access liquidity that is
backed by the government and thus free from any meaningful market
check on the bank’s creditworthiness. Despite the very different
mechanisms through which they operate, both FHLBank advances
and insured deposits attracted with the lure of high interest rates fit
this definition. This Article does not address the numerous other
mechanisms—including open market operations, tax breaks, and promoting a secondary mortgage market—through which the government transfers additional liquidity into banks and the market more
generally.
Second, this Article focuses on crisis periods. Even under normal
market conditions, banks that rely on advances and deposits are
12

See infra Part IV.A.
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shielded from market discipline, and this Article’s analysis cannot be
completely disentwined from the moral hazard issues that are inherent in the programs underlying the alternative discount windows.
Nonetheless, there are reasons to view periods of systemic distress as
qualitatively distinct. In the presence of system-wide liquidity constraints, many of the mechanisms through which a bank can normally
access liquidity—interbank loans, repurchase agreements, selling
loans for securitization, and the like—cease to function normally.13
Banks’ options for obtaining needed liquidity thus change in qualitatively significant ways. The expected social costs of banks’ access to
liquidity similarly change when more of the banks seeking liquidity
are financially distressed.14 More importantly, the underlying moral
hazard issues are well understood. Congress was aware of these
trade-offs when it adopted the underlying programs, and Congress
and regulators have taken steps to reduce the moral hazard these programs engender during normal periods.15 The same cannot be said
of the issues that arise when banks use these programs as substitutes
for the Discount Window. Thus, while this Article’s analysis has
broader implications, the focus is on periods of widespread financial
distress.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I lays the groundwork,
explaining the rationale behind having a lender of last resort and
theories about when a lender of last resort should lend. It describes
why this role is generally given to a central bank and why the Fed is
institutionally well suited to play this role. It also introduces the Discount Window, the primary mechanism through which the Fed serves
as a lender of last resort.
Part II looks at where banks sought liquidity as their access to
market-based funding declined during the Crisis. It shows that banks
increasingly relied upon government-backed sources of liquidity despite the relatively low levels of Discount Window borrowing. Banks
did so through two alternative mechanisms—advances from
FHLBanks and insured deposits attracted or retained using the lure of
exceptionally high interest rates. It further shows that the Crisis is not
the first time that banks tapped these alternative discount windows
when facing liquidity shortfalls.
Part III depicts the rise of the alternative discount windows. With
respect to the FHLBanks and deposit insurance, it explains the history
giving rise to the program, the rationale for its formation, and its
evolution over time. The analysis suggests that the capacity of each
program to serve as an alternative to the Discount Window is an
13
14
15

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part III.B.3.
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unintended consequence of Congress’s attempt to address a distinct
policy aim that banks rationally exploited when given the opportunity.
Part IV examines the benefits, costs, and other consequences of
the operation of the alternative discount windows. By looking at the
temporary programs that the Fed created to supplement the Discount
Window during the Crisis, it identifies some ways that the Discount
Window falls short in response to the range of liquidity constraints
that may arise in a modern financial system. Recognizing these shortcomings allows us to see ways that the alternative discount windows
may yield meaningful welfare benefits even if never designed to serve
this role. The analysis then shifts to the costs and other consequences
of allowing the alternative discount windows to persist in their current
form. This examination suggests that the current regime is likely
suboptimal.
Part V looks ahead. It considers how the insurance scheme administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and
the extension of advances by FHLBanks should be modified to reduce
banks’ capacity to rely upon each when facing liquidity shortfalls. It
also identifies areas that may merit further study in light of the dynamics revealed here.
I
THE FED

AS

LENDER

OF

LAST RESORT

A. Lenders of Last Resort
Banks are inherently unstable institutions. They use short-term
liabilities, like demand deposits, to fund long-term assets, like loans to
businesses and individuals.16 This is a viable business model most of
the time because the circumstances causing one depositor to demand
his money back are generally independent of the liquidity needs of
other depositors.17 This enables banks to use fractional reserves,
holding only a portion of their assets in highly liquid forms.18 In general, this arrangement serves all involved: banks earn higher rates of
return on their assets; some portion of those returns are passed onto
depositors in the form of higher interest rates and lower fees for transaction services; and businesses and others have greater access to capital, facilitating economic activity and growth.
16
See Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last Resort: A Review of the Literature, FIN. STABILITY
REV., Nov. 1999, at 151, 152 [hereinafter Freixas et al., Review of the Literature], available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/fsr/1999/fsr07art6.
pdf.
17
Cf. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 402 (1983) (discussing how the demand deposit system permits efficient risk sharing “among people who need to consume at different random
times”).
18
See Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at 152.

R
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If depositors’ demands become correlated, however, this model
ceases to be viable, and the inherent instability of banks becomes
manifest. When aggregate depositor demands exceed a bank’s liquid
assets, a bank can meet those demands only by selling less liquid assets, such as loans. The need to do so in a very short time frame,
coupled with the frequent lack of an active secondary market for
those assets and information asymmetries, means that such “fire sales”
usually occur at prices well below the fundamental value of the asset
transferred. Forced sales thus tend to reduce the value of a bank’s
assets and can render an otherwise healthy bank insolvent. Aware of
this risk, bank depositors have a rational tendency to run at any sign
of trouble.19 To reduce this inherent instability and in recognition of
the welfare benefits of a functioning banking system, the government
has instituted two programs designed to promote bank stability. The
first—deposit insurance—reduces the incentive of individual depositors to “run” on a bank, thus reducing the likelihood that a bank will
face correlated demands.20 The second—a lender of last resort—
reduces the need for a bank to engage in inefficient fire sales and can
help quell panic among depositors and others.21
Many of the benefits of having a lender of last resort were recognized by Walter Bagehot in 1873, and such regimes have become a
cornerstone of most modern financial systems.22 With access to a
lender of last resort, a bank facing depositor demands in excess of its
liquid reserves can use its illiquid assets as collateral for a loan, providing the bank with the additional liquidity it needs without resorting to
value-destroying fire sales. This helps the bank in question and also
reduces the externality that arises when one bank’s fire sales force
other banks to mark down assets.23 Access to a lender of last resort
can also reduce the tendency of depositors to make correlated demands and may reduce the propensity to panic more generally, as

19

Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 17, at 402–03.
See infra Part III.B.1.
21
Cf. Thomas M. Humphrey, Lender of Last Resort: The Concept in History, FED. RES.
BANK RICHMOND ECON. REV., Mar./Apr. 1989, at 8, 8 (noting that the “mere announcement” of a lender of last resort’s commitment to make a loan to an illiquid bank may, at
times, “assuag[e] people’s fears of [the bank’s] inability to obtain cash,” thereby averting a
run).
22
See generally WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET (Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1962) (1873) (describing the welfare benefits of having a
lender of last resort). While Bagehot was not the first to propose this notion, he has remained the figurehead often associated with it. See Freixas et al., Review of the Literature,
supra note 16, at 151.
23
See., e.g, Ricardo J. Caballero & Alp Simsek, Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity, 68 J.
FIN. 2549 (2013).

R

20

R
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depositors and other creditors have little reason to run on a solvent
bank with ready access to additional liquidity.24
At the same time, access to a lender of last resort can give rise to
troubling distortions in a bank’s operations.25 One challenge is that a
bank, knowing it has ready access to a lender of last resort, has less
incentive to appropriately manage its liquidity risk and will tend to
hold fewer liquid assets than would be optimal. One tool used to deter banks from becoming overly reliant on a lender of last resort is to
force banks to pay “a penalty interest rate” when they borrow from the
lender of last resort.26
A second challenge is that as banks approach insolvency, they
have an incentive to assume greater risks than are socially optimal.27
This incentive exists even in the absence of a lender of last resort, but
the challenge takes on new dimensions when a bank has access to new
sources of liquidity.28 Liquid assets can readily be redeployed in
24
See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 21, at 16 (stating that one role of a lender of last
resort is “to preannounce its policy in advance of crises so as to remove uncertainty”);
William C. Dudley, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the New York
Bankers Association’s 2013 Annual Meeting and Economic Forum: Fixing Wholesale Funding to Build a More Stable Financial System (Feb. 1, 2013), available at http://www.
newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/dud130201.html (stating that a lender of last
resort performs “two key functions”: first, “to provide a precautionary backstop[ ] to reduce the risk of a financial panic beginning in the first place by ensuring that collateral can
always be financed” and thus “reduc[ing] the risk of financial instability due to coordination problems even if the lender of last resort is not utilized”; and second, “to prevent the
fire sale[s] of assets by firms facing a sudden loss of funding”). But see Diamond & Dybvig,
supra note 17, at 417 (questioning the impact of an available lender of last resort on depositors’ propensity to run).
25
In light of the inevitable moral hazard, some economists have suggested that central banks should provide liquidity support solely through monetary policy and should
avoid providing support to individual institutions. See Mark A. Carlson & David C.
Wheelock, The Lender of Last Resort: Lessons from the Fed’s First 100 Years 41 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-056B, 2013), available at http://research.
stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-056.pdf (discussing this position and its advocates).
26
BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: LECTURES BY BEN
S. BERNANKE 7 (2013); see also Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at 159
(discussing ways to counterbalance the moral hazard problem created by overreliance on
liquidity support from a lender of last resort).
27
See, e.g., Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1489 (1993) (“When the corporation is
insolvent or at the brink of insolvency, the difference in risk preference between shareholders and creditors is magnified with respect to corporate investment policies. During
this period of financial stress, shareholders favor highly risky projects, even if these projects
have only a slight chance of generating income large enough to cover the firm’s debt and
still provide some return to shareholders.”); Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Designing a Bank Safety
Net—A Long-term Perspective, WORLD BANK GRP., http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/
html/designing_a_bank_sn.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (noting that “excessive risk taking by banks—moral hazard—becomes worst at the time of adverse economic shocks,
which erode bank capital and increase incentives to take on more risk”).
28
See Anna J. Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed’s Discount Window, FED. RES. BANK ST.
LOUIS REV., Sept./Oct. 1992, at 58, 65–66, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/review/92/09/Misuse_Sep_Oct1992.pdf.
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riskier ways, like making excessively risky loans or acquiring excessively risky assets. The most commonly invoked maxim to address this
risk, and the only one that is directly responsive, is that a lender of last
resort should lend only when an institution is facing a liquidity problem and not a solvency one.29 More bluntly, a lender of last resort
should not lend to insolvent institutions. In practice, central banks
have at times downplayed this norm or conflated it with the notion
that central banks should only lend on good collateral.30 While this
tendency may be warranted at times, the difference between adequate
collateral and solvency remains important.31 Collateral protects the
lender of last resort from experiencing any loss if the bank to which it
has extended a loan fails while the loan is outstanding. But a bank’s
ability to tender appropriate collateral merely provides information
about the types of assets that the bank holds; it provides no information about the value of those assets relative to the bank’s liabilities.
Demanding adequate collateral thus fails to address the challenge that
an insolvent bank will tend to use new liquidity to assume socially inefficient risks.
As the financial markets have evolved, so too have the rationales
for having a lender of last resort. The interbank market, for example,
provides an important mechanism through which a bank can access
needed liquidity and facilitates the redistribution of liquidity from
banks that have it to those in need of it.32 Additionally, more recent
financial innovations, most notably repurchase agreements, typically
provide banks that have adequate and appropriate collateral with a
ready mechanism for accessing liquidity.33 Yet another financial innovation, securitization, has led to an active secondary market for many
types of bank loans, enabling such loans to be sold at fair value. Nonetheless, none of these markets has proven to be a reliable source of
29
See id. at 58 (noting the “ancient injunction” against lending to insolvent banks); see
also BERNANKE, supra note 26, at 7 (noting that lenders of last resort are effective at quelling
runs and ending panic only if the banks receiving injections of liquidity are actually
solvent).
30
See, e.g., BERNANKE, supra note 26, at 94–95 (treating sufficient collateral and solvency as almost interchangeable in explaining why the Fed lacked authority to bail out
Lehman Brothers in September 2008).
31
See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
32
See, e.g., Gara Afonso et al., Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis, 66 J. FIN. 1109, 1109 (2011); Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at
153.
33
Repurchase agreements are effectively short-term collateralized loans structured as
a sale and repurchase of the collateral. Because repurchase-agreement counterparties receive special protections under the Bankruptcy Code, a bank with high-quality collateral
may be able to obtain funding through these agreements even when information asymmetries otherwise limit its access to the interbank market. See Afonso et al., supra note 32, at
1113.
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bank financing during periods of systemic distress.34 For example, the
opacity that envelops banks seems to become particularly pronounced
during periods of distress, making it difficult for market participants
to determine whether a bank is financially sound and reducing the
willingness of banks and others to provide short-term financing.35
Similarly, banks have a rational tendency to hoard liquidity during
such periods, further impeding the efficient redistribution of liquidity
that would occur during other periods.36 As a result, even healthy
banks can face significant challenges obtaining sufficient liquidity during periods of widespread distress.
A related issue is the fuzzy but important distinction between liquidity and capital infusions. Capital infusions, like liquidity infusions, can be justified from a social-welfare perspective, as the failure
of a systemically significant institution can give rise to a range of negative externalities.37 Additionally, the line separating the two can be
thin, as it is not easy to determine whether an institution is solvent and
solvency is a state that can change quite quickly. Moreover, both may
be viewed as a form of bailout in the sense that the institution relies
on government support in order to continue operations. Yet the distinction remains important. A lender of last resort that demands adequate collateral is not necessarily putting taxpayer dollars at risk, and
the moral hazard that arises from liquidity support introduces fewer
distortions than capital support. Thus, even if both can be justified,
capital infusions raise additional concerns and thus are typically
outside the appropriate domain of a lender of last resort.
B. The Federal Reserve
In the United States, as in most countries, the central bank is
empowered to act as the lender of last resort.38 The current central
bank, the Federal Reserve System, was formed in 1913 following a series of banking crises.39 The Great Depression, and the Fed’s failure
to do more to mitigate its effects, led to an expansion of the Fed’s
34
See, e.g., id. at 1110–12 (discussing the potential unraveling of the interbank market
during crisis periods); see also VIRAL V. ACHARYA & DAVID SKEIE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
STAFF REPORT NO. 498, A MODEL OF LIQUIDITY HOARDING AND TERM PREMIA IN INTER-BANK
MARKETS 12–17 (2011) (demonstrating how liquidity hoarding may contribute to the
same).
35
See Mark J. Flannery et al., The 2007–2009 Financial Crisis and Bank Opaqueness, 22 J.
FIN. INTERMEDIATION 55, 55–58 (2013); see also Caballero & Simsek, supra note 23 (discussing the effects of uncertainty on lending).
36
Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned Since Bagehot?, 18 J.
FIN. SERVICES RES. 63, 66–68 (2000) [hereinafter Freixas et al., Since Bagehot].
37
E.g., Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at 158.
38
See BERNANKE, supra note 26, at 4.
39
See id. at 8 (noting that “concerns about both macroeconomic stability and financial stability motivated the decision” to create the Fed).
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authority and altered norms regarding the role that the Fed should
play in helping banks and in using monetary policy to respond to financial crises.40 The Fed’s statutory authority and its policy aims have
been modified further over time, including numerous changes instituted in response to the Crisis.41 In particular, the Crisis served as a
reminder, and the Dodd-Frank Act made explicit, that one function of
the Fed is “to keep the financial system working normally and, in particular, . . . to either prevent or mitigate financial panics or financial
crises.”42 This is in addition to the Fed’s longstanding goals of promoting full employment and maintaining stable prices.43 In addition
to serving as the lender of last resort, the Fed uses monetary policy
(implemented primarily through open market operations) to further
these aims.44
Congress has empowered the Fed to serve as the lender of last
resort through two distinct grants of authority.45 The primary grant of
authority, section 10B of the Federal Reserve Act, authorizes the Fed
to extend loans to member banks.46 This is the basis for the Discount
Window and two related standing programs, one for banks that do not
qualify for the Discount Window and a second for seasonal extensions
of credit.47 Additionally, pursuant to section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act, the Fed may provide liquidity to entities other than member banks under “unusual and exigent circumstances” after determining that credit is not otherwise available and that failure to provide the
40
One of the harshest and most influential critiques came from Milton Friedman and
Anna Schwartz. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1867–1960, at 357–59 (1963).
41
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 41
U.S.C.) (limiting the Fed’s authority to extend loans to nonbanks under Federal Reserve
Act § 13(3)).
42
BERNANKE, supra note 26, at 3.
43
12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012).
44
See, e.g., BERNANKE, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing the purchase and sale of securities on the open market as a means of furthering the Fed’s goal of either raising or lowering short-term interest rates).
45
See Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
46
12 U.S.C. § 347b (2012) (codifying Federal Reserve Act § 10B). The relationship
between the Fed’s role as lender of last resort and its role in implementing monetary policy
has evolved dramatically since the Fed was first formed. Following the lead of the claims
made by the Fed and others regarding the effects of its lending operations, this Article
assumes that such operations may appropriately be classified as creating liquidity. Considering that such operations are now sterilized, whether this is an apt characterization is
questionable. See, e.g, Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking, in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST
RESORT: A READER 145, 148–151 (Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Illing eds., 2002).
47
For an overview of the three programs, see Frequently Asked Questions - Discount Window Lending Programs, FED. RES. DISCOUNT WINDOW & PAYMENT SYS. RISK, http://www.frb
discountwindow.org/dwfaqs.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=75 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
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needed liquidity would adversely affect the economy.48 The Fed invoked this authority during the Crisis, the first time it had done so
since the 1930s, and the Fed’s expansive use of this authority led
Congress to narrow its scope.49 Currently, the Fed can use this authority only to establish programs with broad-based eligibility and subject to additional conditions, including prior approval from the
Secretary of the Treasury.50
While Congress has never effectively conditioned the Fed’s authority to lend on the solvency of the institution receiving the funds, it
has scaled back the Fed’s authority on multiple occasions in order to
prevent and discourage loans to insolvent institutions. For example,
concern that the Fed had extended loans to troubled banks during
the Savings and Loan (S&L) debacle and that those loans increased
the costs borne by the FDIC in winding up failed banks led Congress
to restrict the Fed’s authority to provide support to undercapitalized
institutions.51 Similarly, in recent amendments to section 13(3),
Congress formally denied the Fed the authority to provide funds to an
insolvent firm.52 Congress, however, only required that a firm be
deemed insolvent if it was actually in receivership or had filed for
bankruptcy.53 In short, Congress has signaled that the Fed should not
lend to insolvent institutions, but it has not meaningfully limited the
Fed’s ability to bypass the maxim in practice.54
Congress’s decision to have the Fed act as lender of last resort is
consistent with prevailing theory about where this authority should
lie.55 A primary reason for giving this authority to a central bank that
also has control over the money supply is that the two tools can function as complements, working together to promote financial stability
and growth.56 Another consideration supporting such placement is
48

12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012) (codifying Federal Reserve Act § 13(3)).
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1101, 124 Stat. 1376, 2113 (2010) (amending Federal Reserve Act § 13(3)).
50
Id.
51
See Walker F. Todd, New Discount Window Policy Is Important Element of FDICIA, BANKING POL’Y REP., Mar. 1993, at 1, 13–16 (describing the legislative history and specific statutory changes made to deter the Fed from lending to insolvent institutions).
52
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1101(a)
(amending and adding ¶ (B)(ii) to 12 U.S.C. § 343).
53
Id.
54
This should not be assumed to be an accident. In light of the dynamism of the
financial system and the magnitude of the social costs that can arise when a lender of last
resort fails to act in a timely fashion, it may be appropriate for the scope of the authority
granted to the Fed to exceed established norms regarding when it should appropriately
exercise that authority. See Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft Constraints on
Regulatory Authority, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Judge,
Soft Constraints].
55
See Freixas et al., Since Bagehot, supra note 36, at 71.
56
E.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 16 (9th ed., 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
49
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that central banks, including the Fed, tend to be relatively insulated
from political influence.57 This insularity enables a central bank to
take actions that might be politically unpopular in service of
long-term goals.58 Yet another rationale is that because central banks
alone have the ability to increase the money supply, only central banks
lack other banks’ incentive to hoard liquidity in anticipation of
shortages to address future liquidity needs.59
A specific advantage of having the Fed serve as the lender of last
resort is that there are potential synergies between this role and the
Fed’s role in bank oversight.60 The Fed’s role as supervisor should
provide it access to information and expertise, facilitating its capacity
to make timely assessments of a bank’s financial health.61 Thus, to the
extent that access to liquidity should depend on a bank’s solvency, the
Fed may be particularly well positioned to make that determination.62
At the same time, there are drawbacks to having the Fed serve as
the lender of last resort. While the remarkable degree of independence the Fed enjoys gives it significant leeway to focus on the
long-term best interests of the economy, that independence comes at
the expense of democratic accountability. The Fed’s creative and
pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf (explaining how the Fed can “cushion the impact [of potentially
threatening disturbances] on financial markets and the economy by aggressively and visibly
providing liquidity through open market operations or discount window lending”).
57
See Peter Conti-Brown, The Structure of Federal Reserve Independence 1–5 (Stanford Law
Sch. & The Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 139, 2013), available
at http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication/431459/doc/slspublic/
SSRN-id2275759.pdf (demonstrating the significant independence of the Fed through a
legal and institutional analysis).
58
At the same time, this insularity can be viewed as problematic when a central bank
is given responsibilities with respect to which we might want a greater degree of accountability. See id. at 56.
59
See Viral V. Acharya & Ouarda Merrouche, Precautionary Hoarding of Liquidity and
Interbank Markets: Evidence from the Sub-prime Crisis, 17 REV. FIN. 107, 113 (2013) (“We interpret these findings to imply that, since access to capital markets and wholesale borrowing
in commercial paper markets was impaired for banks . . . these weaker banks engaged in
liquidity hoarding as a precautionary response.”); Jose Berrospide, Bank Liquidity Hoarding
and the Financial Crisis: An Empirical Evaluation 3 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion
Series, Working Paper No. 2013-03, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2207754 (“[D]uring and immediately after a severe liquidity crisis, banks
hoard excess cash to self-insure against further drains of cash and to send markets a strong
message that their solvency is not at risk and that bank runs are not justifiable.”).
60
The Fed has primary oversight responsibility for all state banks that are Fed members, bank holding companies, and systemically important financial institutions. Other
central banks often, but not always, have some oversight authority. See Thomas Cooley et
al., The Power of Central Banks and the Future of the Federal Reserve System, in REGULATING WALL
STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 51, 65–67
(Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011).
61
See id.
62
See Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1310–14 (2013)
[hereinafter Judge, Interbank Discipline] (describing the institutional competence of bank
examiners).
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aggressive use of its lender-of-last-resort authority during the Crisis led
to a new appreciation among members of Congress as well as the public of just how much leeway the Fed enjoys.63 The Crisis also made
clear that the decisions the Fed makes in its role as a lender of last
resort—to whom to extend loans and on what terms—can have significant consequences beyond promoting systemic stability.64 This led
Congress to scale back the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort authority and
sparked a broader debate about whether the Fed should maintain its
current level of independence.65 Less discussed, but also noteworthy,
is the potential for conflicts between the Fed’s role as lender of last
resort and its other roles.66
C. The Discount Window
The primary way that the Fed provides liquidity to banks in need
of it is through its Discount Window.67 All national banks and state
banks have access to the Discount Window, subject to eligibility requirements.68 The Fed manages the credit risk associated with the
63

ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE,
WORK AHEAD 348 (2013) (noting that “even Barney Frank, as smart and knowledgeable a member of Congress as there was, expressed surprise to learn that the Fed has
an essentially unlimited pocketbook”).
64
E.g., Editorial, Questions for Mr. Geithner, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2008), http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/12/15/opinion/15mon1.html?pagewanted=print (suggesting that the
failure to save Lehman led to an “impression of bias created by the disparate treatment of
Lehman and A.I.G.”); Alan Grayson, The Fed Bailouts: Money for Nothing, HUFFINGTON POST
BUS. BLOG (Dec. 5, 2011, 1:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-alan-grayson/thefed-bailouts-money-fo_b_1129988.html (asserting that the Fed’s emergency lending programs allowed it to decide which banks would fail and which ones would survive by applying inconsistent policies, specifically with regards to asset valuation and haircuts).
65
See, e.g., Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2009, H.R. 1207, 111th Cong. (2009)
(proposing to subject the Fed to much more stringent audit requirements); see also Pedro
Nicolaci da Costa, At Jackson Hole, a Growing Fear for Fed Independence, REUTERS (Sept. 2,
2012, 5:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/02/us-usa-fed-politics-idUSBR
E88109Q20120902 (“[O]pposition has emerged against a proactive central bank that has
been forced to widen its range of policy tools in a zero interest rate environment.”).
66
For example, when the Fed uses its lender-of-last-resort authority to extend longerterm loans that expose it to particular types of collateral, it may have an incentive to adopt
monetary policies that would favorably affect the value of that collateral.
67
See, e.g., Cooley et al., supra note 60, at 67–68 (explaining how the discount window
was used the week after 9/11 to meet heightened liquidity needs); The Federal Reserve Discount Window, FED. RES. DISCOUNT WINDOW & PAYMENT SYS. RISK (Mar. 18, 2012), http://
www.frbdiscountwindow.org/discountwindowbook.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=43.
68
The Federal Reserve Discount Window, supra note 67 (limiting Primary Credit borrowing to depository institutions with CAMELS ratings of 1, 2, or 3, or with a CAMELS rating
of 4 and “ongoing examination or other supplementary information indicat[ing] that the
institution is at least adequately capitalized and that its condition has improved sufficiently
to be deemed generally sound by its Reserve Bank”). In 2006, only 50 of 8,693 reporting
depository institutions were placed on the FDIC “problem list,” signifying a CAMELS rating
of 4 or 5; in 2005, 52 of 8,845 instructions received such scores. Q. BANKING PROFILE (Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., Arlington, Va.), Fourth Quarter 2006, at 17 tbl.II-B, 22, available at
http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2006dec/qbp.pdf.
AND THE
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loans it extends through the Discount Window by requiring that all
loans be fully collateralized, requiring a haircut—that is, a discount
on the size of the loan relative to the value of the collateral, and, to a
lesser extent, through the interest rate it charges and the eligibility
requirements.69 The rate the Fed charges on loans extended through
the Discount Window is the “discount rate.”70 Until 2003, the discount rate was set below the prevailing federal funds rate, the target
rate for overnight interbank loans.71 In order to prevent excessive
borrowing, the Fed required a bank seeking funds to demonstrate
that it had a genuine need for the funds and that it lacked the ability
to obtain the necessary funds from private sources.72 Thus, if a bank
obtained financing through the Discount Window, it was a reliable
indication that the bank was unable to meet its financing needs in the
market.
In an effort to reduce the stigma associated with borrowing
through the Discount Window and otherwise improve the efficacy of
the program, the Fed fundamentally revamped the structure of the
Discount Window and related facilities in 2003.73 In its revised incarnation, the program does not require that a bank demonstrate that it
lacks access to private sources of funding before it can borrow.74 As a
result, the Discount Window has become a “no questions asked” facility.75 To counteract the risk that banks will excessively rely on the
Discount Window to meet liquidity needs, the Fed began charging a
“penalty” discount rate.76
Despite this policy change, and despite the officially confidential
nature of loans extended through the Discount Window, there continues to be a perceived stigma attached to borrowing through the
Discount Window.77 Borrowing has often been limited accordingly.
Prior to the Crisis, borrowing through the Discount Window averaged
69
OLIVIER ARMANTIER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 483,
STIGMA IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUIDITY AUCTIONS AND DISCOUNT WINDOW
BORROWING DURING THE CRISIS 5 (2011), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research
/staff_reports/sr483.pdf.
70
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 56, at 46–48.
71
See id. at 47 (describing the history and rationale behind the evolving policy).
72
See ARMANTIER ET AL., supra note 69, at 6.
73
See id.
74
See id. at 6–7 (explaining that “the Fed no longer establishes a bank’s possible
sources of and needs for funding to lend money under the primary credit program”).
75
Frequently Asked Questions - Discount Window Lending Programs, supra note 47 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
76
See ARMANTIER ET AL., supra note 69, at 6.
77
See id. at 7; Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Federal Reserve Board Conference on Key Developments in Monetary Policy: The Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet: An Update (Oct. 8, 2009), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20091008a.htm (“[I]n August
2007 . . . banks were reluctant to rely on discount window credit [to address their funding
needs] . . . . The banks’ concern was that their recourse to the discount window, if it
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less than $200 million per day, a remarkably small figure relative to
the size of the financial system.78 A study by Olivier Armantier and
coauthors shows that during the Crisis, banks were willing to pay on
average an additional thirty-seven basis points in order to avoid the
Discount Window and the associated stigma, and the premium that
banks were willing to pay to avoid the Discount Window increased notably after Lehman Brothers’s bankruptcy.79 Other findings of
Armantier and his coauthors also suggest that banks may have good
reason to be concerned about stigma. As they note: “[a]lthough not
consistently statistically significant, our results are consistent with the
hypothesis that banks visiting the [Discount Window] may face a moderate increase in borrowing costs and a moderate decrease in stock
prices, relative to banks that do not visit the [Discount Window].”80
Having established the reasons for having a lender of last resort
and the advantages of having a central bank, particularly one with the
Fed’s authority and mission, fulfill the role, the next Part reveals how
the Fed’s authority may have been unintentionally weakened by the
creation of two other government programs designed to achieve very
different aims.

BANKS

AND

II
LIQUIDITY DURING

THE

CRISIS

A. The Crisis
The origins for the Crisis were laid during the housing boom of
the mid-2000s. The proliferation of subprime mortgages, securitized
assets backed by subprime mortgages, and other investments with subprime exposure, combined with significant uncertainty about the extent and distribution of such exposures, set the stage for a dramatic
pullback when questions arose regarding the value of subprime mortgages.81 Signs that the market for subprime loans was weakening
started to appear in early 2007, and in July 2007 there was a record
downgrade of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) backed by subprime
somehow became known, would lead market participants to infer weakness—the so-called
stigma problem.”).
78
Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve in the Early Stages of the
Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 55 (2009).
79
See ARMANTIER ET AL., supra note 69, at 3–4. Notably, and seemingly not considered
by the authors, the degree of stigma associated with borrowing through the Discount
Window may have increased in connection with the creation of the Term Auction Facility.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
80
ARMANTIER ET AL., supra note 69, at 4.
81
Cecchetti, supra note 78, at 51.
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loans.82 Yet the system remained relatively resilient despite some localized corrections. That changed in August 2007.
On August 8, 2007, BNP Paribas announced that there had been
such a significant reduction in the liquidity of financial instruments
with subprime exposure that it could not reliably mark certain assets
to market. It further declared that it was suspending redemptions in
three of its funds as a result.83 That announcement helped trigger a
panic. Investors realized that they did not have a good understanding
of the actual value of many of the MBSs and other securitized assets
they were exposed to and that those assets had significantly greater
downside risks than previously recognized.84 Investors responded by
pulling back, in unison, from such assets and investments backed by
them.85 The effects were significant and widespread.86
To understand why this announcement had such systemic ripple
effects, a little background is helpful. In the years before the Crisis,
many banks had created off-balance-sheet entities engaged in maturity
transformation.87 These entities held relatively long-term assets, such
as MBSs and other securitized assets, which they funded with
short-term liabilities, such as commercial paper.88 In the face of
heightened uncertainty about the value of the assets held by these entities, the investors holding the commercial paper ceased rolling over
their investments when they matured.89 The effect was similar to a
82
Id. at 57 (explaining that the original financial crisis likely began in February 2007,
but after lenders began reporting losses, the “spreads between risky and risk-free
bonds . . . began widening in July 2007”); see also Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Mortgage Hot
Potatoes: Banks Try to Return High-Risk Loans to the Originators, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2007),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117150090506509262.html (highlighting the efforts of
lenders to “force mortgage originators to buy back the same high-risk, high-return loans
that the big banks eagerly bought in 2005 and 2006” in response to the weakening MBS
market).
83
See, e.g., Cecchetti, supra note 78, at 57 (noting that a “complete chronology of the
recent financial crisis might start in February 2007, . . . [b]ut the definitive trigger came on
August 9, 2007, when the large French bank BNP Paribas temporarily halted redemptions
from three of its funds because it could not reliably value the assets backed by U.S. subprime mortgage debt held in those funds”).
84
Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and
Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 699–701 (2012) [hereinafter Judge, Fragmentation
Nodes]; Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic 20, 25–26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14398, 2008).
85
Gorton, supra note 84, at 24–25; Transcript of the Meeting of the Federal Open Market
Committee on August 7, 2007, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. 62 (Aug. 7, 2007), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20070807meeting.pdf (Geithner:
“You’re also seeing the difficulties that investors and counterparties now have in evaluating
the risk in exposure to financial counterparties, and you’re seeing in some ways reflecting
all of this a diminished willingness to finance what’s relatively high quality paper.”).
86
See Gorton, supra note 84, at 25–26.
87
See id. at 31.
88
Id. at 19.
89
Id. at 19, 24–26; Transcript of the Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on August
7, 2007, supra note 85, at 69.
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bank run as these entities suddenly faced an acute funding shortage.90
This forced many of the banks that had sponsored off-balance-sheet
entities to bring the entities onto their balance sheets or to find other
ways to provide them access to funding.91 Thus, while the run started
in off-balance-sheet entities that constituted part of the “shadow banking system,” it soon spilled over to banks, causing many to scramble
for liquidity.92
The Fed quickly recognized that banks were experiencing
problems accessing sufficient liquidity in the market, and it made
changes to the Discount Window to encourage banks to use it as a
source of liquidity. With the stated aim of “promot[ing] the restoration of orderly conditions in financial markets,” the Fed cut by half
the spread between the discount rate and the federal funds rate,
bringing it down to fifty basis points, and extended the duration of
Discount Window loans to up to thirty days, renewable by the borrowing bank.93 The Fed subsequently reduced the discount rate further
to a mere twenty-five basis points, and it authorized the extension of
loans for periods of up to ninety days, in addition to taking other steps
to try to encourage banks to borrow through the Discount Window.94
Yet, bank borrowing through the Discount Window was markedly
modest, with average borrowing remaining just over $1 billion for the
first seven months of the Crisis.95 The following two sections examine
how banks obtained government-backed liquidity from sources other
than the Fed.96

90

See Gorton, supra note 84, at 26, 31–32.
Viral V. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer 32, 56 tbl.12 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15730, 2010) (finding that recourse and credit
guarantees provided by bank sponsors ended up covering 97.5% of maturing ABCP).
92
Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of
2007, at 42–43 (May 9, 2009), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/news/conferen/
09fmc/gorton.pdf (summarizing the progression of the shadow banking panic into a more
widespread panic across the industry); see ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 2, at 35–37.
93
Press Release, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (Aug. 17, 2007), http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20070817a.htm.
94
Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS.
(July 30, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_lendingdepository.
htm; see also Adam Ashcraft et al., The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The Lender of
Next-to-Last Resort?, 42 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 551, 569 (2010) (noting that, among
other efforts, the Fed “openly encouraged the use of the Discount Window by identifying
such use as a sign of strength during a specially convened teleconference with a group of
large banks and major investment banking firms”).
95
Cecchetti, supra note 78, at 55.
96
While not new, most of the empirical evidence that follows comes from work in
which economists sought to answer questions quite distinct from those posed here or in
work that lacks the institutional context and framing provided here.
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1. FHLBanks
One of the most significant sources of liquidity for banks following the August 2007 credit freeze was advances from the FHLBanks.97
This is reflected in a study by Viral Acharya, Gara Afonso, and Anna
Kovner that found that banks significantly changed how they funded
themselves between the second and third quarters of 2007.98 The 567
banks in the study increased their reliance on loans through the
Discount Window by an average of $22.7 million during this period.99
The same banks increased their use of FHLBank advances by an average of $137.4 million.100 The study found a similar disparity when
focusing solely on the banks with ABCP exposure, that is, the banks
most likely to face significant funding challenges. Such banks increased their utilization of the Discount Window by an average of
$124.3 million101 while increasing their use of FHLBank advances by
an average of $750.8 million.102
Work by Adam Ashcraft and coauthors provides additional information about banks’ use of FHLBank advances to meet liquidity
shortages.103 They find that between the third and fourth quarters of
2007, FHLBank advances outstanding grew by $235 billion, a 36.7%
increase, and they continued to grow through most of 2008, reaching over $1 trillion at the end of the third quarter of 2008.104
“[I]t was not until May 2008 that [the Fed] became the largest
government-sponsored liquidity facility in terms of crisis-related lending to the financial system.”105 And even when the Fed did surpass
the FHLBank System “in terms of total liquidity provided, the
[FHLBank] System continued to be the largest lender to U.S. depository institutions” because many of the Fed’s programs primarily benefited other types of financial institutions or foreign banks.106 Further
supporting the view that banks were using FHLBank advances to meet
short-term liquidity needs is the fact that the level of advances outstanding declined significantly as banks gained access to other forms
97

See ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 2, at 17, 20–21.
Id. at 14–16.
99
Id. at 49 tbl.2. Two of the authors are at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York;
some of the data came from a proprietary database to which they had access. These figures
are based on borrowing through the Fed’s primary discount window, excluding loans extended through secondary credit and seasonal credit-lending programs. Id. at 20.
100
Id. at 49 tbl.2.
101
Id. There were fifty-three banks in this category.
102
Id.
103
See Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 551–83.
104
Id. at 552–54.
105
Id. at 553.
106
Id. at 554; see also ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 2, at 20 (showing that foreign banks
obtained more capital than U.S. banks in the early stages of the TAF program); Credit and
Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, supra note 94 (summarizing the liquidity facilities
instituted by the Fed, including a number specifically targeted to depository institutions).
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of liquidity support. At the end of 2011, when market sources of liquidity were back to normal, total FHLBank advances outstanding
had shrunk to just $418 billion.107
The evidence not only demonstrates a dramatic rise in banks’ use
of advances during the Crisis but also suggests that troubled banks
were leading this trend. A 2009 study by the FHLBanks’ regulator
found that “FHLBanks made 45% of their total advances to members
characterized by relatively weakened financial conditions.”108 The
regulator further found that:
[T]he Atlanta and San Francisco FHLBanks had the highest percentages of total assets represented by member banks with CAMELS
ratings [in one of the three lowest categories,] 3, 4, and 5—68%
and 78% respectively . . . [, and] between January 2007 and September 2011, many of these poorly rated institutions failed: 149 for the
Atlanta FHLBank and 55 for the San Francisco FHLBank.109

Further evidence comes from Ashcraft and his coauthors, who found
that the five banks that most significantly increased their reliance on
FHLBank advances during the latter part of 2007 based on total dollars borrowed were Washington Mutual, Bank of America,
Countrywide, FSB, Merrill Lynch, and Wachovia Corp., respectively.110
Of these, only Bank of America survived the Crisis; each of the other
institutions went bankrupt or was acquired (often to avert bankruptcy).111 Also notable is the extent to which these banks increased
their use of FHLBank advances. Washington Mutual, which was the
sixth-largest bank in the country when it failed in 2008, increased its
advances by $42.4 billion between the second and fourth quarters of
2007.112 By the end of 2007, Washington Mutual had total advances
outstanding of $63.9 billion, an amount representing nearly 20% of
the bank’s assets.113 Even more striking, Countrywide, which had
107
FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2011, at 28 (2012), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/24009/FHFA_RepToCongr11_6_14_508.pdf.
108
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, AUDIT REPORT AUD-2012-004,
FHFA’S SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANKS’ ADVANCES AND COLLATERAL RISK MANAGEMENT 18 (2012), available at http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/
AUD-2012-004.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FHFA’S SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR FHLBS’ ADVANCES].
109
Id.
110
Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 560 tbl.3. “Merrill Lynch” refers to Merrill Lynch
Bank USA and Merrill Lynch Bank & Trust Co., FSB.
111
Id. Bank of America acquired both Countrywide and Merrill Lynch; Wells Fargo
acquired Wachovia; and Washington Mutual failed. Id. at 576–77.
112
Id. at 560 tbl.3; see also Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Largest Bank Failure, U.S.
Seizes, Then Sells, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A1 (recapping the federal government’s
seizure and subsequent sale of Washington Mutual to JPMorgan Chase).
113
Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 560 tbl.3.; see also SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS:
FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET FROM WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 84
(2012) (describing the way that Washington Mutual used FHLBank advances to compensate for its rapidly shrinking deposit base).
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massive subprime exposure, increased its total advances to $47.7 billion, an amount equal to nearly 40% of the bank’s assets as of the end
of 2007.114
FHLBank advances differ from Discount Window loans in a number of ways apart from stigma and source. Both Discount Window
loans and FHLBank advances must be fully collateralized, but while
there is substantial overlap in the types of collateral accepted, there
are some differences, in part because individual FHLBanks retain
some discretion with respect to the types of collateral they will accept
and the haircuts they demand.115 The FHLBanks also enjoy another
significant advantage over the Fed when loaning funds to potentially
troubled institutions. If a member bank fails, an FHLBank that has
advanced funds to the bank is given a statutory “super-lien,” putting it
in line in front of all other creditors, including the Fed and the
FDIC.116
From the perspective of the borrowing bank, a distinct advantage
of using FHLBank advances is that the terms tend to be more flexible
and the duration can be substantially longer than Discount Window
loans. FHLBank advances “may be fixed or adjustable rate, with terms
ranging from one day to 30 years.”117 Looking at the cumulative evidence regarding banks’ reliance on the Discount Window and
FHLBank advances, Ashcraft and his coauthors suggest that one reason that banks relied so much more on FHLBank advances than the
Discount Window during the early part of the Crisis was the relatively
more attractive terms of FHLBank advances.118 In their view, “the liquidity facilities of the [Fed] and the FHLB System have at the same
time competed with and complemented each other.”119
2. Deposits
Another source of liquidity that banks increasingly relied on during the Crisis was deposits. Deposits can be categorized into two
groups—insured and uninsured.120 Both insured and uninsured
114

Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 560 tbl.3.
Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(3) (2012) (describing eligible collateral for FHLBank
advances), with 12 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2013) (describing eligible collateral for Discount
Window loans).
116
See 12 U.S.C. § 1430(e).
117
See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 15,
2013) (describing the Bank’s “primary business” as “providing competitively priced, collateralized loans, known as advances, to [their] members”).
118
Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 559–61.
119
Id. at 553.
120
See Viral V. Acharya & Nada Mora, Are Banks Passive Liquidity Backstops? Deposit
Rates and Flows During the 2007–2009 Crisis 2–3, chart 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 17838, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17838 (tracking the differences of insured and uninsured deposits of failed banks).
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deposits come from private persons, not government entities.121
Nonetheless, insured deposits are appropriately deemed
government-backed because FDIC insurance puts the government on
the hook financially and because depositors know that they will be
made whole so long as either the bank or the FDIC can perform on its
commitment.122 Hence, the government backing affects depositors’
willingness to provide a bank with funds.
A challenge in trying to assess the extent that banks relied on
deposits attracted or retained by virtue of the government backing is
the lack of a readily identifiable baseline against which to measure
distortions. Deposits tend to go down when a bank faces financial
distress.123 For example, “[d]eposit outflows [at Washington Mutual]
averaged $1.2 billion a day” in the week after another large bank
failed and averaged $750 million a day the following week.124 The
tendency for depositors to “run” is much greater for uninsured deposits, but as Viral Acharya and Nada Mora show, insured deposits also
tend to decline in the period prior to a bank’s failure.125 Against this
backdrop, bank efforts that reduce the rate at which deposits are withdrawn, like efforts to attract new deposits, have the effect of increasing
bank liquidity relative to what it would be in the absence of such efforts. Thus, from the perspective of a bank, insured deposits attracted
or retained with the lure of exceptionally high interest rates can function as a substitute for going to the Discount Window.126
There is significant evidence that banks actively sought to attract
and retain deposits during the Crisis and that the most troubled banks
engaged in the most aggressive efforts. Acharya and Mora examined
the interest rates banks offered on demand and time deposits and the
flows of deposits into and out of banks during the Crisis.127 They
show that banks facing financial distress tended to offer increasingly
attractive interest rates as a way of retaining and attracting deposits
and that the “banks that raised deposit rates were those vulnerable to
liquidity risk, especially in the first year of the crisis.”128 Additionally,
“[p]remiums on deposit rates were positive in the period leading up
to a bank’s failure[;] . . . these premiums typically increased as the
bank was about to fail[; and] . . . higher deposit rates were not limited
121
See Deposit Insurance Summary, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/deposit
/deposits/dis/index.html (last updated Oct. 17, 2013).
122
Id.
123
See BAIR, supra note 113, at 84.
124
Id.
125
See Acharya & Mora, supra note 120, at 31–32.
126
See, e.g., id. at 4–8 (noting that banks offered higher rates to attract funds and
providing a variety of explanations for deposit withdrawals when a bank, or the financial
system, is facing distress).
127
See id. at 16–22.
128
Id. at 18.
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to large time deposits, but also characterized core deposit rates.”129
They further find that while banks faced a net outflow of deposits as
they approached failure, the trend was reversed with respect to insured deposits.130 Up until the quarter before failure, banks, using
higher interest rates as the draw, “were able to attract insured deposit
inflows.”131 Acharya and Mora’s findings thus further illustrate that it
was the government backing that enabled banks to use higher interest
rates to retain and attract funds, and so the additional liquidity banks
enjoyed may appropriately be deemed government-backed.
Overall, their findings are thus consistent “with the hypothesis
that banks about to fail experienced increasingly large deposit outflows and reacted by raising deposit rates in an effort to stem the
loss.”132 Focusing on four large banks that failed or nearly failed during the Crisis—IndyMac, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and Citi—
they find that the interest rate the banks offered on 12-month certificates of deposit (CDs) was on average a full 100 basis points higher
than the market average for the period, and the interest the banks
offered on 60-month CDs was a full 130 basis points higher than the
market average.133 Anecdotal evidence further suggests that banks’
interest-rate policies played a meaningful role in enabling troubled
banks to maintain higher levels of deposits than they would have without efforts to exploit the value of FDIC insurance.134
To be sure, because of the lack of a relevant baseline, the data on
banks’ interest-rate policies and deposit patterns cannot readily be
translated into figures showing the aggregate amount of funds that
banks managed to attract or retain by offering exceptionally high interest rates on insured deposits. Additionally, the net effect on banks’
liquidity was likely significantly smaller than FHLBank advances.
Nonetheless, the evidence clearly suggests that insured deposits were a
source of liquidity that many banks, and particularly the most troubled ones, relied on during the Crisis. And, because the deposits were
insured, there is no reason to expect that there is a meaningful correlation between the premium that banks paid for those deposits and
the magnitude of the increased credit risk that the banks posed.
129

Id. at 17, tbl.2.
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 3, chart 1b.
134
For example, an informal conversation with a hedge fund manager revealed that
he had moved $1 million into demand accounts (in his name and on behalf of immediate
family) with a little-known bank because the accounts paid an interest rate that was nearly
100 basis points above Treasuries. He had no faith in the bank but had used a tool on the
FDIC’s website to ensure that he structured the accounts so that all were fully insured.
130
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B. Some History
The policy implications of the existence of the alternative discount windows depend in part on whether their use was unique to the
Crisis. This subpart uses evidence from the S&L debacle to show that
banks’ use of the alternative discount windows was not an isolated
phenomenon.
The roots of the S&L debacle were laid in the late 1970s and the
early 1980s.135 The primary asset type held by most S&Ls was
long-term residential mortgages paying a fixed rate of interest.136
Thus, when interest rates skyrocketed, the asset side of S&Ls’ balance
sheets took a significant hit137 as the S&Ls were caught holding stockpiles of long-term mortgages paying below-market interest rates. At
the same time, rising interest rates and the rise of money market mutual funds made it difficult for S&Ls to retain deposits without offering interest rates that far exceeded what they were earning on their
assets.138 The net income for the industry fell from “$781 million in
1980 . . . to negative $4.6 billion and $4.1 billion in 1981 and 1982.”139
Nonetheless, in part because policymakers believed that the insolvent
S&Ls could recover, the initial regulatory and congressional responses
to the S&L debacle entailed numerous policies that allowed insolvent
institutions to remain in operation and tended to expand the range of
activities in which they could engage.140 The S&L debacle is relevant
here because both insured deposits attracted with the promise of
above-market interest rates and FHLBank advances were among the
sources of financing that troubled S&Ls relied on to fund their
operations.
The effects of efforts by troubled S&Ls to attract deposits with the
lure of high interest rates were most dramatic in the geographic regions with the most troubled S&Ls, with Texas being the lead example. By year-end 1987, 44% of insolvent S&Ls were based in Texas.141
The dire condition of these institutions limited their ability to access
market-based sources of liquidity and gave them an incentive to exploit government-backed deposits to the greatest extent practical,
135
See Michael Waldman, The S&L Collapse: The Cost of a Congress for Sale, 2 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 47, 48 (1990).
136
Alane Moysich, The Savings and Loan Crisis and Its Relationship to Banking, in 1 FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 167, 168 (1997).
137
Id.
138
The interest rates being paid by S&Ls fluctuated in part in response to changing
government policies, including the imposition of an interest rate cap in 1966 and the gradual removal of that cap between 1980 and 1986. See id. at 172–73 (explaining the fluctuation of interest rates due to various government regulations).
139
Id. at 168.
140
Id. at 172–77 (describing various government actions taken in response to the S&L
debacle).
141
Id. at 183.
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which they did by offering exceptionally high interest rates on deposits.142 Moreover, the high interest rates being offered by troubled
Texas S&Ls attracted depositors away from other Texas institutions,
including well-capitalized S&Ls and other banking institutions.143 In
response, these solvent, well-capitalized institutions were forced to offer depositors “the so-called Texas premium” in order just to retain
their funding base. At its highest, in 1987, the Texas premium was
estimated to be at least fifty basis points.144 These premiums persisted
until Congress adopted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), finally providing regulators
the capital necessary to close all of the troubled S&Ls.145 Thus, the
S&L debacle reveals an important collateral consequence of banks’
using higher interest rates to attract deposits as they approach insolvency—the adverse effect on healthy banks competing for those
deposits.146
Troubled thrifts also relied on FHLBank advances to continue
operations when facing challenges accessing sufficient liquidity in the
market. One study shows, for example, that:
[O]f the 205 failed thrifts that were resolved . . . in 1988, . . . 76
percent borrowed from their FHLBank three years before closure
[and] some of these thrifts financed about 72 percent of their total
assets with FHLBank loans. By contrast, only 40 percent of their
solvent counterparts borrowed from FHLBanks at the end of
1988[,]

and the typical amount borrowed was lower for solvent thrifts.147 The
study further found that “[b]oth nationwide and in five of the six
states [that accounted for the largest share of costly resolutions of
failed thrifts], insolvent thrifts . . . borrowed proportionately more
from FHLBanks than solvent institutions.”148 The study’s authors conclude: the “results suggest that FHLBank advances were used more by
financially distressed thrift institutions than by other firms”; FHLBank
advances “may have added to the cost of resolving failed thrifts during
142

Id. at 176 & n.27, 181–82.
GENIE D. SHORT & JEFFERY W. GUNTHER, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., THE TEXAS
THRIFT SITUATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TEXAS FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 6–7 (1988); Texas Marketers Battle High Rates and Bad Publicity: Emphasis on Service, Safety and Lower Rates Begins to
Pay Off, SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, Sept. 1988, at 84.
144
Moysich, supra note 136, at 183.
145
Id. at 183–84.
146
Acharya & Mora, supra note 120, at 2 (quoting then-CEO and Chairman of Bank of
America Kenneth D. Lewis as saying, “The fact that Washington Mutual is now owned by
Chase is very positive, because they were a huge outlier on rates.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
147
Lisa K. Ashley et al., Access to FHLBank Advances and the Performance of Thrift Institutions, FED. RES. BANK CHI. ECON. PERSP., 2nd Quarter 1998, at 33, 33.
148
Id. at 40, 41 tbl.6.
143
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the 1980s and early 1990s, contributing to one of the most expensive
bailouts in U.S. history”; “[b]y insulating [thrifts] from market discipline, FHLBank advance programs provide incentives for thrifts to
take more risk”; and “value-maximizing troubled thrifts will tend to
borrow more, . . . [t]hus, access to FHLBank advances provides benefits to financially distressed institutions.”149
While the S&L debacle may appropriately be deemed something
less than a full financial crisis, it was the core of the largest wave of
bank failures prior to the Crisis.150 That banks, particularly those facing distress, tended to rely on insured deposits attracted with high
interest rates and FHLBank advances to meet their liquidity needs
during this period illustrates that these tendencies are not limited to
the Crisis.151 This suggests that the presence of the alternative discount windows as standing programs that banks can use to access liquidity is likely to pose a persistent challenge that will not go away
without intervention.
III
HOW DID THIS HAPPEN?
There are meaningful differences between the two programs giving rise to each of the alternative discount windows identified here.
In order to explore the significance of banks’ reliance on each, this
Part considers the origins of each program, the aims they were designed to achieve, and how they have evolved over time.
A. FHLBanks
1. History
The FHLBank System consists of twelve regional banks and a central body that coordinates the issuance of debt, which constitutes the
primary source of funds for the FHLBanks.152 Formed in 1932, the
FHLBank System was the first GSE designed to help Americans realize
149
Id. at 47; see also Dusan Stojanovic et al., Is Federal Home Loan Bank Funding a Risky
Business for the FDIC?, REGIONAL ECONOMIST, Oct. 2000, https://www.stlouisfed.org/
publications/re/articles/?id=482 (describing ways that FHLBank advances can increase
FDIC losses).
150
See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 28 (5th ed.
2013) (referring to the bank failure rates during the S&L crisis as “unequaled” since the
Great Depression, but stating that the banking industry “returned to financial health” after
the end of the S&L crisis in the 1990s and thus was not a full-blown financial crisis).
151
See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
96-221, § 103, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (2012))
(amending the term “depository institution” to include “any insured bank as defined in
section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act”).
152
See Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 555–56, 559 fig.1.
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the dream of home ownership.153 At that time, banking institutions
were divided into meaningfully distinct breeds. Commercial banks
specialized in providing businesses access to capital while thrifts specialized in satisfying the credit needs of ordinary Americans, which
included providing home loans.154 Generally organized as mutual organizations rather than for-profit institutions, thrifts “sought social uplift, not private gain.”155 Against this backdrop, Congress reasonably
concluded that one way to promote home ownership would be to provide thrifts access to a stable and competitively priced source of funding, which they could then use to extend home loans. FHLBank
advances fulfill this function, and providing advances has remained
the primary role played by FHLBanks.156 While FHLBank advances
have tended to be longer term than Discount Window loans and were
designed to achieve a distinct aim, there are parallels between the two
regimes. This was particularly true during the decades prior to 1980,
when thrifts lacked access to the Discount Window.157
In the period since the FHLBank System was first instituted, two
developments have largely elided what had been the critical distinction between commercial banks and thrifts. First, beginning in the
1980s, lawmakers significantly expanded the range of activities permissible for thrifts, enabling them to engage in activities far removed
from extending home loans.158 Second, commercial banks started to
extend home loans, taking over a significant portion of the market.159
These developments significantly weakened the relationship between
providing advances to thrifts and the ability of consumers to obtain
home loans on reasonable terms. They also led a number of commentators to suggest that the FHLBank System should be eliminated or
substantially restructured to tighten the relationship between the government support provided to the FHLBanks and the aim of
153
Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725, 725 (1922) (creating
the FHLBank System and providing for supervision thereof); CARNELL ET AL., supra note
150, at 14 (stating that the thrift industry arose to help Americans “of modest means” own
homes).
154
See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 150, at 14 (observing that thrifts developed to help
ordinary Americans whereas banks had traditionally “serv[ed] the needs of commerce”).
155
See id. at 14.
156
The Federal Home Loan Banks: The Basics, FHLBANKS 2–3, http://www.fhlbanks.com/
assets/pdfs/sidebar/FHLBanks_TheBasics_4_2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
157
See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, tit. II, 94 Stat. 132, 142–45 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12, 15 U.S.C. (2012)) (extending Discount Window eligibility to thrifts).
158
See Waldman, supra note 135, at 48.
159
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-489T, FEDERAL HOME LOAN
BANK SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW OF CHANGES AND CURRENT ISSUES AFFECTING THE SYSTEM 3,
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/111492.pdf (“[C]ommercial banks
now account for more than 70 percent of all [FHLBank] System members . . . .”).
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promoting home ownership.160 Nonetheless, while Congress did
make changes to the FHLBank System following these developments,
those changes worked in the opposite direction—they expanded the
FHLBank System in a way that further attenuated the relationship between the services it provides and its original aims. Congress’s reasons
for doing so can only be understood in context.
In 1989, Congress recognized that it needed to resolve the S&L
debacle and that it was going to be costly to do so. After numerous
botched attempts to resolve the situation without providing adequate
financial support to wind down the insolvent thrifts, Congress had
come to appreciate that trying to avoid the costs of a bailout would
only increase the government’s eventual bill.161 Nonetheless,
Congress was far from eager to have taxpayers directly foot the full
$50 billion that the Bush administration suggested was necessary to
shut down the remaining insolvent thrifts.162 Accentuating Congress’s
general hesitance was its desire to honor the fiscal discipline imposed
by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit-reduction targets.163 Thus,
leading members of Congress and other prominent experts, including
then-Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan and then-Treasury Secretary
Nicholas Brady, endorsed finding a way to fund the S&L clean up “offbudget.”164 Long controversial, off-budget financing entails borrowing or lending by a federally related entity that is not included in the
federal budget.165 This includes the FHLBanks and, until they were
put into conservatorship in 2008, the other GSEs, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.166
160
See, e.g., Improving the Regulation of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan
Banks: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 13–16
(2004) (statement of Richard S. Carnell, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University
School of Law), available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction
=Files.View&FileStore_id=386fbcae-4798-4aa2-ab91-f56702bd9a11 (recommending GSE reform); Ashley et al., supra note 147, at 33 (explaining that the evolution of the mortgage
market since the FHLBank System was created “raise[d] the question whether there is a
need for a government-sponsored liquidity facility for real-estate-specialized lending
institutions”).
161
See Dirk S. Adams, Rodney R. Peck & Jill W. Spencer, FIRREA and the New Federal
Home Loan Bank System, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 17, 45–51 (1992) (describing the earlier
congressional actions and the failure of each).
162
See Kenneth Ryder, A Guide to FIRREA’s Off-Budget Financing, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
82, 82 (1990).
163
Id. at 89 n.3 (“The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99–177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985), as amended . . . established specific limits on the
size of the federal deficit in each . . . year[ ]” leading up to 1993, when it was to reach
zero.).
164
See Geoffrey A. Campbell, Treasury Chief Says House Thrift Plan Will Boost Costs,
Weaken Discipline, BOND BUYER, July 11, 1989, at 4; Margaret Soares, FSLIC Bailout: Does
Washington Know What It’s Doing? Bush’s Thrift-Rescue Plan Receives Poor Reviews from Wall
Street, BOND BUYER, Apr. 28, 1989, at 1A.
165
Ryder, supra note 162, at 83.
166
See id. at 83–84.
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In order to “honor” the deficit reduction target, the final S&L
bill, FIRREA, mandated a complex two-entity structure for winding
down defunct thrifts.167 The first entity, the Resolution Trust
Corporation, was a federal agency with federal employees.168 Managed by the FDIC, it had full responsibility for winding down the failing thrifts.169 The second entity, RefCorp, was a financial
intermediary with no employees that existed solely to provide the
Resolution Trust Corporation with the funds necessary to cover insured deposits and other expenses associated with closing down insolvent thrifts.170 Those funds came from the capital contributions that
the FHLBanks and thrifts were required to make pursuant to FIRREA
and from the issuance of $30 billion in RefCorp bonds.171 In addition
to investments acquired with the original capital contributions, the
bonds were to be paid off with proceeds from the sale of assets of
failed thrifts and further contributions from the FHLBanks, with
Treasury serving as a backstop if other sources proved insufficient.172
In short, the FHLBanks played a critical role in keeping the majority of the funds required to resolve the S&L debacle off-budget.
The FHLBanks thus became useful to Congress for reasons quite
apart from their role in facilitating home ownership.173 In this light,
it is less surprising that Congress did not view FIRREA as an opportune time to eliminate or substantially shrink the FHLBank System
despite the increasingly attenuated relationship between the services
it provides and its original function. Notably, Congress not only allowed them to persist but also significantly expanded their membership in a way that further attenuated that relationship. In so doing,
Congress also increased the FHLBanks’ expected revenue, thus increasing their capacity to pay the interest owed on the RefCorp bonds.
Most significantly, FIRREA authorized commercial banks to become
members of the FHLBank System, subject only to the requirement
that the bank meet certain (relatively weak and subsequently weakened) thresholds regarding its involvement in extending residential
loans.174 Congress has also made other changes to the FHLBank
167
See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, §§ 501, 511, 103 Stat. 183, 363–394 (1989).
168
See Ryder, supra note 162, at 83, 85.
169
See id. at 83–85.
170
See id. at 84–85.
171
See id. at 82–83, 90 n.12.
172
Id. at 85.
173
See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Announces Completion of
RefCorp Obligation and Approves FHLB Plans to Build Capital (Aug. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/21861/refcorp080511.pdf (observing that the FHLBanks
paid off the RefCorp bond obligations in full in 2011).
174
See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, § 704, 103 Stat 183, 415–16 (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
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System, including expanding the range of services it provides to member banks.175 Nonetheless, providing advances remains their primary
activity, and individual FHLBanks continue to identify “enhanc[ing]
the availability of credit for residential mortgages and economic development by providing a readily available, competitively priced source
of funds for housing and community lenders” as their primary
function.176
The net result has been to dramatically increase the size of the
FHLBank System, and thus the value of government subsidy the system receives, even as its reason for its existence has become increasingly questionable as a policy matter.177 According to one study by
the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, the FHLBank System enjoyed
$3.4 billion and $3.6 billion in implicit federal support and tax savings
in 2003 and 2002, respectively.178 Of these amounts, just $200 million
and $300 million accrued to the benefit of conforming mortgage borrowers, with the remainder captured by the FHLBanks and their stakeholders, including member banks.179
2. Structure and Function
Also relevant to the significance of banks’ ability to use FHLBank
advances in lieu of borrowing through the Discount Window are the
institutional competence and structure of the FHLBank System.
§ 1424(a) (2012)); Stojanovic et al., supra note 149 (explaining that with the changes effectuated by Gramm-Leach-Bliley, “nearly all of the nation’s thrifts and commercial banks”
would be eligible to become members of the FHLBank System). Insurance companies are
now also eligible to become FHLBank members. 12 U.S.C. § 1424(a).
175
One way the FHLBanks clearly further the aim of supporting affordable housing is
by complying with their statutory obligation to contribute the larger of $100 million or
10% of net earnings to an affordable housing program each year. See Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 § 721.
176
Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 14, 2012); see
also Aligning the Costs and Benefits of the Housing Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (statement of
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Office) (explaining that, while engaged in a variety of activities, the “Federal Home Loan Banks are primarily in the business
of borrowing in the capital markets and lending to member institutions, including banks”);
Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 556 (explaining that “[a]dvances constitute 68.8% of the
FHLB System’s $1,349.1 billion in total assets” as of December 31, 2008).
177
Pursuant to its statutory mandate, the FHLBanks are only authorized to provide
long-term advances “for the purposes of . . . providing funds to any member for residential
housing finance [or] providing funds to any community financial institution for small businesses, small farms, small agri-businesses, [or] community development activities.” 12
U.S.C. § 1430(a)(2) (2012). Nonetheless, given the inherent fungibility of capital, there is
no meaningful way for FHLBanks to enforce this and little indication that they have made
any effort to do so.
178
See DEBORAH LUCAS & DAVID TORREGROSA, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED ESTIMATES OF THE SUBSIDIES TO THE HOUSING GSES 10 tbl.5 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.
gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/53xx/doc5368/04-08-gse.pdf.
179
Id.
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While the structure of the FHLBanks bears some resemblance to the
Fed—twelve regional banks with a coordinating body based in
Washington, D.C.—the two systems are quite different in operation.180 The regional banks of the Fed continue to play a number of
important roles, particularly on the operational front, but the Board
of Governors or the Federal Open Market Committee make virtually
all of the important policy decisions.181 Thus, a body in which the
majority, and often all, of the members have been appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate approves all significant policy
decisions.182 Moreover, while each of the regional banks is structured
as a mutual organization and thus is “owned” by member banks,183
any profits earned by the Federal Reserve System are turned over to
the Treasury at the end of each year.184 The Fed is thus a largely
centralized system designed to achieve clearly articulated public policy
aims under the oversight of political appointees.
The FHLBank System has a very different structure. There is
some degree of coordination, but most of it centers on the issuance of
“consolidated obligations,” the joint and several debt obligations that
fund most FHLBank operations.185 Moreover, while subject to federal
oversight by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, each FHLBank enjoys, and exercises, significant independence, and there is relatively
little coordination among them.186 Additionally, the majority of the
members on the board of directors for each FHLBank are officers or
directors of member banks.187 The FHLBank System is further distinguished from the Fed in that any profits earned by FHLBanks, including those derived from direct and indirect government subsidies, are
passed on as dividends to member banks.188 The FHLBank System is
180

See supra Part I.B (discussing the Fed’s general structure and operations).
See The Structure of the Federal Reserve System: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/
frseri.htm (last updated July 8, 2003).
182
See id.
183
See Who Owns the Federal Reserve?, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.
federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_14986.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2013).
184
The Structure of the Federal Reserve System: Federal Reserve Banks, BOARD GOVERNORS
FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri3.htm (last updated Apr.
17, 2009).
185
Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 556. This is done by the FHLBanks’ Office of
Finance. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FHFA’S SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR FHLBS’ ADVANCES, supra note 108, at 7 n.8.
186
See Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 557 (noting that the federal government regulates the FHLBanks for “safety and soundness” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Investor Relations, FED. HOME LOAN BANK S.F., http://www.fhlbsf.com/about/investor/default.
aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (noting that “[e]ach FHLBank is a separate entity, with its
own board of directors, management, and employees”).
187
12 U.S.C. § 1427 (2012).
188
The favorable tax status of the bonds they issue, the lower yield they must pay on
those bonds because of the implicit government backing, and the statutory protections
181
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thus significantly more private, less publicly accountable, and less centralized than the Fed.
Another important distinction between the FHLBank System and
the Fed arises from how they fund their lending operations. Through
the early stages of the Crisis, the Fed lent out cash primarily by selling
U.S. Treasuries or not replenishing its portfolio as issues matured.189
It was not until the failure of Lehman Brothers that the Fed could no
longer balance its liquidity injections in this manner, at which point
Treasury instituted a supplementary financing program to support the
Fed’s activities.190 By contrast, the FHLBanks required new capital in
order to meet members’ rising demands for advances, which they
could obtain only by issuing new debt and requiring members to acquire additional stock.191 Market expectations that the government
would stand behind GSE debt enabled the FHLBanks to access capital
on relatively favorable terms during the early stages of the Crisis.192
Nonetheless, as the spread between GSE debt and Treasuries started
to widen in mid-2008, capital became more costly for the
FHLBanks.193 Thus, as recognized by Ashcraft and his coauthors,
“events in 2008 revealed . . . [that] relying on market funding using an
implicit government guarantee is unlikely to be sufficient for a lender
of last resort to be entirely effective during a financial crisis—exactly
when you need one most.”194
B. The FDIC
1. Deposit Insurance
Deposit insurance is another byproduct of the Great Depression.
The Banking Act of 1933 instituted a regime for insuring deposits and
created the FDIC to administer the insurance fund and oversee insured state banks that are not members of the Fed.195 Deposit insurance serves a number of related goals. The primary rationale for
FHLBanks enjoy when they have advances outstanding to a member bank that fails are
among the benefits the government confers on FHLBanks. See Ashcraft et al., supra note
94, at 556–57. The dividends paid to members can be significant. See, e.g., Investor Relations, supra note 186 (noting that between 2003 and 2008, the FHLBank of San Francisco
paid its members dividends at annualized rates ranging from 3.93% to 5.41%).
189
Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 578.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 577–78.
192
See id. at 554, 560.
193
Id. at 579.
194
Id.
195
DIV. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 2 (1988) [hereinafter FDIC, HISTORY OF DEPOSIT
INSURANCE]. A number of states had instituted deposit insurance regimes prior to the
Great Depression, but with the exception of Texas, no state had sufficient funds to make
all depositors whole as bank closures spread in the 1920s and 1930s. Id. at 12–16.
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deposit insurance is to improve bank stability by discouraging runs.196
Because depositors who are first in line get paid in full while those
who delay can end up receiving something less than the full amount
the bank owes them, depositors will rationally run in the face of
trouble even if they believe their bank to be solvent.197 By assuring
depositors that they will be paid in full, deposit insurance discourages
bank runs and increases bank stability.
A related function of deposit insurance is to protect depositors.
Voters’ desire for deposit insurance is credited with playing a significant role in its adoption in 1933, and consumer protection remains a
core concern animating many aspects of banking regulation.198 Yet
another rationale for deposit insurance, coupled with the grant of
oversight authority in a governmental regulator, is efficiency based.
There is little evidence that small individual depositors can effectively
monitor a bank’s financial health, and it would be exceptionally time
consuming for each to do so.199 Deposit insurance frees small depositors from this task, placing it instead in the hands of a specialized
regulator who can more efficiently monitor and discipline the bank.
Today, FDIC insurance covers a range of account types, including
money market deposit accounts and certificates of deposit, in addition
to checking and savings accounts, up to the insured limit of
$250,000.200 The limit applies to enumerated account types, per insured bank, so it is possible for a depositor to enjoy protection in excess of this limit depending on how she structures her accounts.201
Insured deposits primarily represent a relationship between the bank
and the depositor, and it is those parties who determine whether a
depositor will provide funds to a bank and on what terms. Thus, in
contrast to the FHLBanks and the Fed, the FDIC is not the one providing the liquidity in the discount window enabled by the insurance
fund it administers. As a result, the policy implications arising from
this window depend on the tools that the FDIC has to control the
196
See id. at 20 (noting that as confidence in the banking system eroded, runs on
banks became more common). After the implementation of federal deposit insurance,
runs on banks decreased, indicating that public confidence had increased. Id. at 34; see
supra Part I.A.
197
Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 17, at 402–03.
198
FDIC, HISTORY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE, supra note 195, at 25–27 (describing how
Senator Carter Glass, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee and a
leading proponent of banking reform, had been opposed to deposit insurance, but he and
others were swayed by public opinion).
199
Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at 153; see also MATHIAS
DEWATRIPONT & JEAN TIROLE, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANKS 5–6 (Mass. Inst. of
Tech. 1994) (1993) (“Small depositors have neither the incentive nor the competence to
collect information or to intervene into bank management.”).
200
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 335, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(a)(1)(E) (2012).
201
Deposit Insurance Summary, supra note 121.
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terms that a bank offers to depositors and depositor incentives rather
than on the governance structure of the FDIC. The next two sections
address those issues in turn.
2. The FDIC and Deposits
The FDIC has very little control over the interest rates banks offer
on deposits, insured or otherwise. Historically, the interest rates
banks could offer on insured deposits were capped at a statutory maximum.202 Statutory caps were removed, however, when banks began
losing substantial funds to money market funds,203 and there are advantages to allowing rates to be determined in a competitive market
without extensive government intervention.204 In response to banks’
abuse of insured deposits during the S&L debacle, Congress placed
limits on the interest rates that an insured institution can offer on
brokered deposits.205 But because the Internet and other technologies enable banks to attract new depositors without relying on brokers,
this limitation does not suffice to address the challenge as it exists
today. Moreover, in its implementing rules, the FDIC exempts “well
capitalized” banks, so most banks enjoy complete discretion over their
interest-rate policies.206 More generally, while the FDIC’s control over
a bank’s operations tends to increase significantly when a bank is not
adequately capitalized, experience has shown that capitalization ratios
are a lagging indicator, so these additional control mechanisms provide the FDIC limited ability to address the dynamics revealed here.207
3. Moral Hazard
Despite widespread support, deposit insurance has generated significant controversy. Because depositors are assured that they will receive 100% of their funds up to the statutory limit, they have little
incentive to monitor their bank’s financial health. Hence, a bank
202
12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (1986), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/
7500-1600.html (promulgating Regulation Q).
203
R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It Passed Away, FED.
RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV., Feb. 1986, at 22, 30, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/review/86/02/Requiem_Feb1986.pdf.
204
See id. at 34–35 (enumerating problems arising from Regulation Q, including creating challenges for depository institutions, discriminating against small savers, and failing to
increase residential mortgage credit); Scott Winningham, The Effects of Removing Regulation
Q—A Theoretical Analysis, FED RES. BANK KAN. CITY ECON. REV., MAY 1980, at 13, 23, available
at http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/ECONREV/econrevarchive/1980/2q80
winn.pdf (summarizing the effects of removing Regulation Q, including increasing GNP
and decreasing volatility in market interest rates).
205
12 U.S.C. § 1831f(e) (2012) (restricting the interest that banks may pay on “funds
obtained, directly or indirectly, by or through a deposit broker”).
206
12 C.F.R. § 337.6 (2013).
207
E.g., Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 351 (1993).
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engaging in reckless behavior can attract capital from depositors on
terms that do not reflect the riskiness of the bank’s activities. This
moral hazard increases along with the amount of coverage provided
and thus is greater today than it was prior to the Crisis, when accounts
were insured only up to $100,000.208 Moreover, because a bank’s
shareholders often benefit from a bank assuming excessive risk, deposit insurance can subsidize and incentivize banks’ risk taking.209
Congress has sought to address this risk, most directly by mandating that the premium a bank pays for deposit insurance reflect the
riskiness of that bank’s activities.210 By forcing banks to internalize
the costs of their risk taking, such a regime should address both the
subsidy and incentive issues. In practice, risk-based deposit insurance
has proven incredibly difficult to implement, and most banks underpay for the coverage they receive.211 A persistent challenge is that the
information on which a bank’s current premium is based is almost
always stale. Given the rapidity with which banks can reallocate assets
in ways that significantly change their risk profile and how quickly asset prices can change, this issue becomes even more difficult during
periods of systemic distress. Thus, risk-based premiums do not alleviate, and may do little to reduce, the ability of troubled banks to use
insured deposits as a source of liquidity and to reallocate the funds so
received in troubling ways.

ASSESSING

THE

IV
ALTERNATIVE DISCOUNT WINDOWS

This Part assesses some consequences of the current regime. It
examines the benefits, costs, and other effects of allowing the alternative discount windows to continue to operate in their current forms.
A. Benefits
One model of regulatory behavior assumes that regulators seek to
maintain and increase their influence. In this frame, the Fed’s
208
Id. at 320; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial
Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 215, 406–07 (“[M]oral hazard encourages banks to assume greater risks whenever
capital requirements and deposit insurance premiums do not compel banks to internalize
the risk-related costs of their activities.”).
209
E.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Solving the Corporate Governance Problems
of Banks: A Proposal, 120 BANKING L.J. 326, 328 (2003) (“[T]he implementation of deposit
insurance poses a regulatory cost of its own—it gives the shareholders and the managers of
insured banks incentives to engage in excessive risk taking.”).
210
See FDIC, HISTORY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE, supra note 195, at 54; see also Carnell,
supra note 207, at 358–59 (explaining that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 introduced a risk-based premium system).
211
E.g., Wilmarth, supra note 208, at 266–67 (describing why most banks pay too little
for deposit insurance).
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apparent acquiescence to the developments described here may seem
surprising. A closer look at the context in which the Fed was operating, however, suggests a more complex account. During the Crisis,
the Fed created a number of temporary mechanisms for infusing liquidity into banks and other financial institutions.212 The creation
and terms of these programs reflect the Fed’s recognition that the
Discount Window alone did not suffice to meet the liquidity needs of
the financial system. The Fed’s decision to create these facilities and
the structures of each also reflect the nature of the Discount Window’s shortcomings. As a result, looking at the other facilities the Fed
formed sheds light on ways that the alternative discount windows may
yield social benefits. At the same time, public scrutiny of the Fed’s
actions reveals why the Fed may be perfectly content to allow the alternative discount windows to persist, as their operations may reduce the
amount of lending the Fed must undertake and defend. This subpart
provides a brief introduction to these programs and some of the limitations inherent in the Discount Window, as revealed by the Fed’s actions. It then considers the capacity of the alternative discount
windows to overcome these shortcomings and otherwise promote
socially desirable aims.
1. The Fed’s Actions During the Crisis
The Fed recognized early in the Crisis that despite its numerous
efforts to encourage banks to borrow through the Discount Window,
utilization seemed significantly below the optimal level in light of the
ongoing liquidity constraints in the market.213 In order to facilitate
the transfer of additional liquidity, the Fed created a number of temporary facilities that banks and, subsequently, other financial institutions could use to obtain collateralized loans from the Fed. The first
such facility, the Term Auction Facility (TAF), was available only to
banks that could also access the Discount Window and was adopted
under the same authority pursuant to which the Fed operates the
Discount Window.214 The primary rationale for instituting this facility
was a fear that banks were underutilizing the Discount Window because of the associated stigma.215 Thus, in addition to simply being a
212

See infra Part IV.A–B.
See Transcript of the Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on September 18, 2007,
BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. 128 (Sept. 18, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20070918meeting.pdf (Bernanke: “Are there ways to provide
liquidity that would help normalize money markets, particularly term money markets, and
would allow banks to make use of the enormous amount of collateral they have at the
discount window, but would avoid the stigma and create a more efficient system?”).
214
For a description of the TAF structure, see ARMANTIER ET AL., supra note 69, at 7–8.
215
E.g., Transcript of the Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on September 18, 2007,
supra note 213, at 128 (Bernanke: “The solution that the staff came up with [to enable
banks to use Discount Window–eligible collateral to secure liquidity without bearing the
213
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new facility and thus free from historical baggage, the TAF was
structured to minimize the possibility that usage would signal bank
distress.216
Notably, because it was available to the same banks, using the
same collateral, the TAF likely affected the amount banks subsequently borrowed through the Discount Window. More specifically,
the funds transferred from the Fed to banks through the TAF consisted of (1) liquidity transfers that otherwise would have occurred
through the Discount Window, and (2) liquidity transfers that would
not have occurred but for the TAF, so the creation of the TAF likely
reduced Discount Window borrowing.217 Both because the increased
use of the Discount Window that would likely have occurred without
the TAF may have reduced the associated stigma and because the existence of a parallel program specifically designed to signal a lack of
desperation may have exacerbated the degree of desperation signaled
by borrowing through the Discount Window, the TAF may best be
viewed as both reflecting and accentuating the stigma associated with
the Discount Window.
As the Crisis deepened, the Fed became increasingly aggressive in
its creation of temporary mechanisms for transferring additional liquidity to the market. Following the near failure of Bear Stearns in
March 2008, the Fed instituted the Primary Dealer Credit Facility,
which provided overnight loans in exchange for a specified range of
eligible collateral, and the Term Securities Lending Facility, which
provided Treasury securities in exchange for less liquid collateral for
twenty-eight-day periods.218 In contrast to the TAF, the institutions
eligible to participate in these programs were not banks otherwise eligible to use the Discount Window; rather, they were primary dealers,
that is, the financial institutions that serve as trading counterparties to
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its implementation of monetary policy.219 This was possible because these programs were adopted
pursuant to section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which gives the
perceived stigma of borrowing through the Discount Window] was to have an auction facility that would essentially set an endogenous price and, because it was an auction, it might
look more like a good business proposition rather than like a move of desperation and,
therefore, would not have the same stigma.”).
216
Id.
217
See ARMANTIER ET AL., supra note 69, at 3–4.
218
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S SECTION 13(3) LENDING FACILITIES TO SUPPORT OVERALL MARKET LIQUIDITY:
FUNCTION, STATUS, AND RISK MANAGEMENT 31, 47 (2010) [hereinafter OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GEN., SECTION 13(3) LENDING FACILITIES], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/
files/FRS_Lending_Facilities_Report_final-11-23-10_web.pdf.
219
See id. at 32. The rationale was that “[b]y increasing the ability of primary dealers
to finance their portfolios, the [Term Securities Lending Facility] reduced the primary
dealers’ need to sell assets into increasingly illiquid markets and decreased the likelihood
of lenders losing confidence in primary dealers.” Id.
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Fed significantly greater discretion in its role as lender of last resort
when facing “unusual and exigent circumstances.”220 Subsequent to
the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the market
fallout that followed, the Fed became even more creative and aggressive, adopting four additional broad-based facilities that provided further liquidity support to particular sectors of the market.221 Starting
with Bear Stearns, the Fed also used its section 13(3) authority to provide support for specific institutions it deemed particularly important
to systemic stability.222
2. Some Explanations
The temporary facilities instituted by the Fed differed from the
Discount Window, and deviated from the norms pursuant to which a
lender of last resort should lend, in numerous ways. The rationales
underlying the creation and structure of these facilities sheds light on
why the Discount Window alone may not suffice to respond to the
liquidity shortages that arise, and which a lender of last resort should
address, in a modern financial system.
One obvious advantage of the Fed’s temporary programs, most
clearly reflected in the creation and structure of the TAF, is that they
were free from the perceived stigma associated with the Discount
Window. The effects of the perceived stigma may have been particularly great in light of changes in banking over the last few decades.
The nature of interbank relationships today go far beyond the provision of short-term funds and payment systems, and the potential for
banks to be subject to cripplingly harsh market discipline has gone up
accordingly.223 These developments may limit the capacity of the
Discount Window to provide a bank with sufficient liquidity support to
survive once market participants turn against it, in addition to making
banks rationally concerned about sending any signals of potential financial distress.
Another function of the Fed’s temporary programs was to provide liquidity support to the shadow banking system.224 In the years
before the Crisis, the shadow banking system had grown remarkably,
220

See supra Part I.B.
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SECTION 13(3) LENDING FACILITIES, supra note 218, at
3–4 (describing each of the facilities).
222
See, e.g., William Poole, Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009,
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 434 (2010) (describing the Fed’s use of its section 13(3)
powers to provide emergency assistance to Bear Stearns and AIG).
223
Judge, Interbank Discipline, supra note 62, at 1280 (describing how the types of interbank relationships that exist have increased in recent decades, resulting in higher interbank credit exposure and more powerful interbank discipline).
224
See ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458,
SHADOW BANKING 25 (2010) (“Upon the full rollout of the liquidity facilities, large-scale
asset purchases and guarantee schemes, the shadow banking system was fully embraced by
221
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and remarkably quickly, so that by the time the Crisis hit, this system
played a central role in fulfilling many of the economic functions
traditionally performed by banks. Moreover, while sitting just outside
the formally regulated banking system, it was intricately intertwined
with that system and subject to many of the same vulnerabilities.225
The Discount Window, however, is available only to banks.226 The
structure of the temporary facilities the Fed created, and other actions
taken by the Fed over the course of the Crisis, thus may be viewed as
reflecting an understanding that allowing critical components of the
shadow banking system to fail may be just as devastating to the functioning of the overall financial system as allowing excessive bank failures; and, the Discount Window was only indirectly helpful in
alleviating those liquidity shortages.
More broadly, through its temporary programs, the Fed significantly increased the total amount of government-backed liquidity entering the market.227 The Fed did so because liquidity shortages
disrupt markets and hamper the efficient provision of credit.228 This
is one of the primary ways that banking crises adversely affect the real
economy, and the failure of the Fed to provide banks with sufficient
liquidity is viewed as one of the leading factors contributing to the
depth of the Great Depression.229 As a leading scholar on the Great
Depression, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke was clearly attuned to this
dynamic, and his comments during and subsequent to the Crisis often
focus on the importance of liquidity.230 Hence, the Fed’s many programs may be viewed as part of a broader effort to transfer more aggregate liquidity into the financial system.
official credit and liquidity puts, and became fully backstopped, just like the traditional
banking system.”).
225
See supra Part II.A.
226
See POZSAR ET AL., supra note 224, at 2 (“[W]hat distinguishes shadow banks from
traditional banks is their lack of access to public sources of liquidity such as the Federal
Reserve’s discount window . . . .”).
227
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SECTION 13(3) LENDING FACILITIES, supra note 218, at
5 (noting that at the peak “the combined usage of the lending facilities reached $600
billion”).
228
See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation
of the Great Depression, AM. ECON. REV., June 1983, at 257, 263–67 (arguing that “the disruption of the financial sector by the banking and debt crises raised the real cost of intermediation between lenders and certain classes of borrowers”).
229
See BEN S. BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION 42–43, 45 (2004) (noting
that the Fed was unwilling to assume the responsibility to fight bank runs); FRIEDMAN &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 357–59; Bernanke, supra note 228, at 263–67, 272–74.
230
See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Lecture at George Washington University School of Business: The Federal Reserve and the
Financial Crisis (Mar. 20, 2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/
files/chairman-bernanke-lecture1-20120320.pdf (“[P]roviding short-term credit to financial institutions during a period of panic or crisis can help calm the market, can help
stabilize those institutions and can help mitigate or bring to an end a financial crisis.”).
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This list is far from exhaustive; numerous other factors influenced the Fed’s actions during this period and the ramifications of
those actions. For example, most of the Fed’s temporary facilities
lacked a meaningful tool for distinguishing between solvent and
insolvent recipients, despite the longstanding maxim to the contrary.
This may reflect a belief that such distinctions are very difficult to
make in a short time frame, particularly when liquidity shortages are
undermining pricing accuracy.231 Another consideration, more specific to the Fed’s silence in the face of the alternative discount windows, is that the Fed may have believed that the market’s need for
government-backed liquidity exceeded the amount that the public
wanted to see injected. The movement of liquidity through the alternative discount windows occurred not only without involvement by
the Fed but also largely outside the public eye. This may have reduced public accountability, but it may also have facilitated the transfer of more liquidity than would have occurred otherwise.
None of these explanations necessarily justify the trade-offs inherent in the Fed’s creation of the temporary facilities. With the benefit
of hindsight, we can see that there was no meaningful inflection
point, returning the financial system to a more positive and stable
course, until after Lehman Brothers failed, government support increased significantly, and reliable information about the financial
health of specific institutions was made public.232 Because it was only
after the Fed and other government actors had effectively backstopped every core component of the banking and shadow banking
systems that the Crisis came to an end, it is hard to know whether the
Fed’s intermediate efforts were on net beneficial. Nonetheless, the
Fed’s actions need not be assumed to be righteous to reflect genuine
shortcomings in the capacity of the Discount Window to respond to
the liquidity shortages that can arise in a modern financial system.
These shortcomings may enable the alternative discount windows to
serve a socially useful function.
3. The Benefits
The potential benefits of the alternative discount windows largely
mirror the benefits of the Fed’s temporary facilities. First, because
231
See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Avoiding Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political
Economy of Systemic Risk Management 47 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 277/2010, 2010) (noting that “at a time of systemic financial distress, ‘liquidity’
and ‘solvency’ are not so clearly divided”). But see Schwartz, supra note 28, at 59 (challenging this contention).
232
See POZSAR ET AL., supra note 224, at 2 (“The run on the shadow banking system,
which began in the summer of 2007 and peaked following the failure of Lehman in
September and October 2008, was stabilized only after the creation of a series of official
liquidity facilities and credit guarantees that replaced private sector guarantees entirely.”).
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banks rely on deposits and FHLBank advances for purposes other
than meeting short-term liquidity shortfalls, banks’ reliance on the alternative discount windows need not be construed as a signal of distress. Thus, like the TAF, the alternative discount windows may serve
as mechanisms through which banks can access government-backed
liquidity without the stigma associated with the Discount Window. For
the same reason, the alternative discount windows may help shield
banks from excessively harsh market discipline.
The capacity of the alternative discount windows to respond to
other limitations inherent in the Discount Window are more mixed.
Because only banks can access the alternative discount windows, they
are little more effective than the Discount Window in responding to
liquidity shortages that arise primarily in the shadow banking system.
To be sure, some of the additional liquidity transferred through the
alternative discount windows may have helped indirectly to reduce
these liquidity shortages. There are myriad connections between the
banking and shadow banking systems.233 Just as liquidity shortages in
the shadow banking system can lead to liquidity shortfalls at banks,
providing additional liquidity to banks can help avert further liquidity
strains and promote the transfer of liquidity to the shadow banking
system. Additionally, the Fed took separate actions, such as enabling
depository institutions to provide massive amounts of liquidity support
to broker-dealer affiliates, which facilitated the movement of liquidity
from banks into other areas of the financial system.234 The alternative
discount windows may thus have helped to alleviate liquidity strains in
the shadow banking system, but they did so in an imperfect and potentially costly manner.
Framed more broadly, the alternative discount windows likely facilitated the transfer of more liquidity to banks and the financial system in general than would have occurred in their absence,
particularly during the early stages of the Crisis.235 There is also evidence suggesting that liquidity shortfalls during this period had adverse effects on borrowers who had relationships with affected banks
and the communities in which they operated, supporting the potential value of the increased liquidity transfers.236 To the extent that
233
See, e.g., id. at 2, 10, 19 (describing the connections between the banking and
shadow banking systems).
234
See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise
of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1729–46 (2011) (describing the
ways that the Fed provided extensive exemptions from section 23A of the Federal Reserve
Act as a way of enabling banks to use their liquidity to provide support for key components
of the shadow banking system).
235
See id. at 1726–29.
236
See, e.g., ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 2, at 20–28 (showing that corporate borrowers
with relationships to foreign banks that had more limited access to dollar liquidity in the
wake of the August 2005 credit crunch paid higher interest rates than similar corporate
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limitations inherent in the Discount Window, and limits on the Fed,
resulted in the provision of too little liquidity support, the alternative
discount windows may have helped to bring the amount of support
provided closer to the socially optimal level.237 At the same time, because they are available only to banks, the alternative discount windows are not well suited to respond directly to many of the Discount
Window’s shortcomings.
B. Some Drawbacks
The alternative discount windows were not formulated to play
this role. It is thus not surprising that they are not all that well suited
to it. This subpart addresses the main costs that arise from their
operation.
1. Inefficient Risk Assumption
As a bank approaches insolvency, it has an incentive to engage in
socially excessive risk taking, as the bank’s shareholders still enjoy unlimited upside should the gamble pay off while having little to no
downside exposure. The bad incentives facing a bank so positioned
are not a product of a bank’s access to liquidity and thus are not a
moral hazard that arises directly from access to a lender of last resort.
Nonetheless, the ability to convert illiquid assets into highly liquid
ones significantly increases the capacity of an insolvent bank to engage in welfare-destroying activities by providing the bank with assets
that it may readily redeploy in riskier ways.238
borrowers who obtained syndicated loans through U.S. banks that were relatively less affected); Juan Carlos Gozzi & Martin Goetz, Liquidity Shocks, Local Banks, and Economic
Activity: Evidence from the 2007–2009 Crisis 6 (Nov. 12, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1709677 (finding that metropolitan areas “where
banks relied more heavily on wholesale funding experienced larger decreases in
employment and establishments during the crisis” and noting that their “findings are consistent with the idea that adverse shocks to bank liquidity had a negative effect on economic activity”).
237
As explained above, the analysis here assumes without exploring that it is appropriate to treat the Fed’s lending operations as liquidity-creation mechanisms. See supra note
46.
238
This practice is commonly known as asset substitution. That banks must pay a relatively high rate for some of the funds they receive through the alternative discount windows, most notably those obtained by offering high interest rates on insured deposits, may
limit the amount of asset substitution in which they can engage by setting a higher bar for
the expected returns a project must earn. That said, this higher bar may also exacerbate
the challenge, particularly if there is no meaningful external factor limiting the range of
high-risk loans and other investments that a bank may make. Cf. Mark J. Flannery, Financial Crises, Payment System Problems, and Discount Window Lending, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 804, 819 (1996) (“If the Fed sets a penalty rate on loans during [certain types of]
financial cris[es], it may suffer a winner’s curse vis-à-vis private lenders, potentially increasing its cost of intervention.”).
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Both the alternative discount windows and the temporary facilities instituted by the Fed lack a meaningful check on the solvency of
the bank receiving the funds.239 Whether and to what extent
government-backed liquidity actually engendered inefficient
risk taking during the early stages of the Crisis is not clear. While
liquidity-constrained banks reduced their willingness to extend loans
in the early stages of the Crisis, bank loans actually increased over the
first year of the Crisis.240 Another significant change in banks’ risk
exposures between August 2007 and September 2008 was that “large
banks . . . appreciably increased their holdings of MBS and ABS securities and trading assets.”241 There are numerous explanations for
these patterns other than excessive risk taking. For example, many of
the loans resulted from firms drawing down on outstanding lines of
credit and the transfer of loans that had been “warehoused” in anticipation of a securitization transaction that never materialized back
onto the balance sheet of the originating bank.242 Nonetheless, in
light of these patterns, it cannot be ruled out that some banks used
the liquidity access they enjoyed early in the Crisis to extend loans and
acquire assets that entailed socially suboptimal levels of risk.
More to the point, both theory and evidence suggest that banks
in poor financial health disproportionately use the alternative discount windows to access additional liquidity. The FHLBanks can
make advances conditional upon borrower characteristics, but in practice most FHLBanks tend to lend freely to any bank that has an adequate rating from its primary regulator—an approach that excludes
only a small proportion of troubled banks.243 Moreover, FHLBanks
have little reason to do more. Because of their overcollateralization
requirements and the statutory preferences given to the FHLBanks
when a bank is dissolved, no FHLBank has ever lost money on an advance despite the failure of many banks with significant outstanding
advances.244 The FDIC is more likely than the FHLBank to suffer a
loss as a result of a decision by an FHLBank to provide an advance to a
239

See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 66.
See, e.g., id.; Acharya & Mora, supra note 120, at 17.
241
Acharya & Mora, supra note 120, at 13, tbl.A2; see also Zhiguo He et al., Balance Sheet
Adjustments in the 2008 Crisis 11–14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
15919, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1560067 (describing changes in commercial bank balance sheets and the growth of the banking sector during the Crisis).
242
See Acharya & Mora, supra note 120, at 11.
243
See Dusan Stojanovic et al., Do Federal Home Loan Bank Membership and Advances Increase Bank Risk-Taking?, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 680, 684 (2008) (“[I]n practice FHLBanks
define an ‘unacceptable’ supervisory rating as a CAMELS 4 or 5 composite. At year-end
2005, only 44 US banks (0.59%) posted such a rating, and just 34 of those banks were
FHLBank members.” (footnote omitted)).
244
Id. at 683.
240
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financially unsound bank.245 Thus, FHLBanks cannot be expected to
provide advances only to creditworthy banks.
The situation is different but no less troubling with respect to
insured deposits. In this context, the funds are coming not from the
FDIC but from the market.246 Again, however, the providers of the
liquidity—depositors—have little incentive to assess a bank’s financial
health because, again, the FDIC is the party most likely to suffer a loss
should the bank receiving the funds fail. And, the FDIC has limited
authority to intervene in this relationship.247 These incentives, in
conjunction with the evidence from the Crisis and the S&L debacle
indicating that financially distressed banks tended to rely on
FHLBank advances and insured deposits attracted with the promise of
higher interest rates more than other banks, suggest these patterns
will continue absent intervention.248 There is thus reason to be concerned that the liquidity provided through the alternative discount
windows is disproportionately likely to be deployed in ways that reduce social welfare.
2. Systemic Risk
Closely related to concerns about moral hazard are questions of
institutional competence. During the Crisis, for example, individual
FHLBanks significantly increased their overcollateralization requirements to minimize the credit risk arising from the provision of advances.249 FHLBanks made these decisions on an individualized basis
to protect their individual financial health.250 Yet, by affecting the
ability of member banks to access liquidity and the terms on which
they could do so, the FHLBanks were simultaneously making decisions that had significant systemic consequences. The FHLBanks have
neither the incentives nor competence necessary to address these effects.251 The situation is no less problematic with respect to insured
deposits. As just described, consumers—the suppliers of insured deposits—are basing their decisions on the costs and benefits to
245
See Rosalind L. Bennett et al., Should the FDIC Worry About the FHLB? The Impact of
Federal Home Loan Bank Advances on the Bank Insurance Fund 6 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research,
Working Paper No. 2005-10, 2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/
2005/wp2005/CFRWP_2005_10_Bennett_Vaughan_Yeager.pdf (stating that the evidence
points to an increase, albeit nontrivial, in Deposit Fund losses due to FHLBank advances).
246
Stojanovic et al., supra note 243, at 683–84.
247
See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
248
See supra Part II.A.
249
See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 27,
2009); Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 32 (Mar. 26,
2009); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FHFA’S SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR FHLBS’ ADVANCES,
supra note 108, at 7.
250
See Ashley et al., supra note 147, at 33–34.
251
See Stojanovic et al., supra note 243, at 683.
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themselves, not the costs and benefits to the system; and, the FDIC has
limited capacity to intervene in ways that might address the systemic
consequences of changes in the volume, terms, and allocation of insured deposits. Thus, in contrast to the Discount Window and other
temporary facilities instituted by the Fed, the alternative discount windows lie outside the control of a regulator that has the competence to
appreciate the systemic ramifications of how liquidity is provided and
the incentives to ensure that it is provided in ways that promote systemic stability.
A final challenge is that both of the alternative discount windows
are subject to external constraints that the Fed does not face and that
may reduce their utility in precisely the circumstances in which they
are most needed. Banks’ reliance on FHLBank advances declined as
the Crisis deepened.252 This occurred, at least in part, because the
FHLBanks too faced higher funding costs, and this reduced the relative attractiveness of the terms they could offer on advances.253 Similarly, when banks are at the core of a financial crisis, deposits may
become less sticky and the terms banks must offer to retain and attract
them can become less attractive (from the bank’s perspective), reducing banks’ capacity to use insured deposits as a source of liquidity.254
As a result, FHLBank advances and insured deposits can become
more costly precisely when banks most need liquidity. This is in stark
contrast to the terms of the Discount Window. Because the Fed exercises full control over the terms of Discount Window loans and faces
no external constraint on the amount of liquidity it can provide, it can
make, and has made, terms more favorable as conditions worsen.255
This is likely to be the appropriate response if the aim is to ensure that
government-backed liquidity is most readily available when its absence
might doom otherwise healthy institutions and give rise to other
troubling systemic effects.
3. Liquidity Risk
Another drawback of banks’ ability to access liquidity from
sources other than the Fed is that access to government-backed liquidity may reduce banks’ incentives to maintain socially optimal levels of
252
See Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 554 (“[T]he FHLB System found itself ‘guilty by
association’ and saw its borrowing costs (and hence advance rates) rise and its own availability of term funding limited. As a result, the Discount Window became the more attractively priced liquidity facility and saw a significant increase in borrowings.”).
253
See supra Part III.A.2.
254
See id.
255
See Gordon & Muller, supra note 231, at 29 (stating that “the Fed can lend to
[banks] without limit” and “[t]he Fed also has considerable discretion to redefine the parameters of collateral that it will accept”). While the Fed may have to consider how to fund
lender-of-last-resort operations to the extent it seeks to sterilize those activities, support has
been readily provided when needed. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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liquidity reserves. Liquidity is costly for a bank to maintain.256 Banks
thus have an incentive to reduce their liquidity reserves to the fullest
extent practical.257 The less liquidity a bank retains, the greater its
liquidity risk and its fragility. When banks in general have less liquidity, the system as a whole becomes less stable. This has long been
recognized and is the primary rationale for imposing a “penalty rate”
when a bank seeks liquidity from the lender of last resort.258 While
there may be reasons for reducing that penalty during periods of systemic distress, the imposition of the penalty under normal conditions
plays a critical role in incenting banks to maintain sufficient liquidity.
For reasons relating to the institutional competence issues just
discussed, neither depositors nor the FHLBanks have the incentives
and means to ensure that banks maintain healthy liquidity reserves.
The alternative discount windows similarly lack a mechanism for ensuring that banks are paying a rate that is penalized to the appropriate
extent, balancing the long-term aim of encouraging banks to maintain
sufficient liquidity and possible short-term concerns about systemic liquidity shortfalls. Hence, even though banks may pay a slight premium if they seek to increase their use of the alternative discount
windows as a source of liquidity under normal conditions, there is little reason to expect that the premium they will pay is anywhere near
the optimal level. Assuming the premium is too small much of the
time, access to the alternative discount windows may enable banks to
maintain insufficient liquidity reserves, increasing systemic fragility.
New liquidity requirements are being imposed on banks following the
Crisis, which should help reduce this risk, but those requirements are
unlikely to eliminate it, making this an ongoing challenge.259
256
See ORACLE, LIQUIDITY RISK: THINKING BEYOND COMPLIANCE 4 (2012), available at
http://www.oracle.com/us/industries/financial-services/liquid-risk-compliance-wp-1872
381.pdf (stating that “the cost of liquidity will increase as banks look to lengthen their
funding maturity profiles, move away from volatile short-term wholesale funding, and adjust their balance sheets with higher-quality assets that are traditionally more expensive and
historically lower yielding”); Morten Bech & Todd Keister, On the Liquidity Coverage Ratio
and Monetary Policy Implementation, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2010, at 49, 52, http://www.bis.org/
publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1212g.pdf (noting that the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requirement
instituted by Basel III forcing banks to hold a sufficient stock of highly liquid assets may be
costly for banks to meet).
257
See Bech & Keister, supra note 256, at 52 (“Insofar as meeting the LCR requirement
is costly for banks, it is conceivable that some banks may not exceed the regulatory threshold by a
considerable margin, which could allow the LCR to impact the implementation of monetary
policy.”) (emphasis added).
258
Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at 158–59.
259
See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III:
THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS 2 (2013) (stressing
that the LCR is not sufficient to measure all dimensions of a bank’s liquidity profile, thus
requiring the Basel Committee to develop a set of tools to monitor the liquidity risk exposures of banks); Statement of the Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm. on the Basel Proposed
Rules on Liquidity Regulation and a Suggestion for a Better Approach (Sept. 12, 2011),
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4. Information and Leverage
A primary reason for the Fed to serve as the lender of last resort is
the potential synergies between this role and other roles that it fulfills.
One type of synergy is informational. Through its open market operations, for example, the Fed gains first-hand insight into market conditions on a daily basis. This is in addition to the information the Fed
enjoys as a result of its oversight authority. Nonetheless, significant
information asymmetries between banks and the Fed persist.260 These
information asymmetries not only inhibit the Fed’s ability to serve as
an effective lender of last resort but also can impair its ability to make
wise decisions with respect to monetary policy and other matters.261
Serving as the lender of last resort could help reduce these information asymmetries.
As an initial matter, if banks had little choice but to go to the Fed
when unable to meet their liquidity needs in the market, the Fed
would obtain a constant flow of information about the amount of liquidity flowing through the market and which banks are facing the
greatest challenges accessing it. The existence of the alternative discount windows weakens the relationship between the demand for
Fed-provided liquidity and the nature and magnitude of liquidity constraints in the market, thereby reducing the quality of the information
conveyed by that demand.
A related challenge is that banks’ ability to seek liquidity through
the alternative discount windows reduces the amount of leverage that
the Fed enjoys when extending loans through the Discount Window
and other programs.262 There are a number of ways that the Fed
could use its role as lender of last resort to generate valuable
http://www.aei.org/files/2011/11/17/-statementno317_134640473279.pdf (stating that liquidity requirements will not eliminate liquidity risk from the banking system and are not a
substitute for a lender of last resort).
260
The Fed’s failure to appreciate the nature and extent of interconnections among
banks is illustrated in its ongoing effort to adopt a rule limiting interbank exposures. In
January 2012, the Fed proposed a rule prohibiting the largest banks from having credit
exposures to one another in excess of 10% of their regulatory capital. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg.
594, 600 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252). In public letters and
closed-door meetings, the banks argued that the proposed standard was unrealistic in light
of their operations. See Judge, Interbank Discipline, supra note 62, at 1284–86, and sources
cited therein. More than a year later, the rule has yet to be finalized and the Fed has
signaled that it will likely modify its proposal, suggesting that the Fed misjudged the nature
and degree of connections among them. Michael R. Crittenden, Fed Slows Down Bid to Curb
Banks’ Exposure to One Another, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424127887324616604578304481952496090.html.
261
See supra Part II.A.2.
262
For a more complete discussion of these dynamics, see Kathryn Judge, Thirteen
Months (Feb. 5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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information about market conditions.263 For example, when faced
with persistent liquidity shortages of the type that characterized the
Crisis, the Fed could attach information-generating conditions to certain liquidity facilities or to certain types of loans extended through
the Discount Window.264 Alternatively, the Fed could use its leverage
to impose solvency or other conditions that could send a positive signal to the market regarding a bank’s financial health when the bank
receives support through a particular facility, thereby counteracting
the possible stigma. While there would be risks associated with imposing any such conditions, just as there were risks associated with the
first round of stress tests, there could also be benefits that would justify those risks.265 The point here is not to assess when it may be appropriate to use such conditions but to illustrate why they may be
warranted and how the alternative discount windows weaken the Fed’s
capacity to impose conditions as a way of furthering information-related aims.
5. Collateral Costs
Most of the issues addressed thus far are greater issues with respect to FHLBank advances than insured deposits because of the
greater magnitude of those liquidity transfers and the ease with which
banks can access advances. Yet, a particular reason to be concerned
about banks’ efforts to attract insured deposits with the lure of high
interest rates is that those deposits must come from somewhere. The
higher the interest rate a bank is offering, the more willing a depositor will be to transfer some or all of his funds from his current bank to
the troubled bank. Particularly with respect to time deposits like CDs,
the relatively minor effort required to move funds from one bank to
another may be outweighed by the additional interest earned.266 This
puts pressure on the bank losing the funds. A healthy bank may find
263

Id.
The Fed did this in modest ways in connection with many of the facilities it instituted under section 13(3), but information generation does not appear to have been a
primary aim of these conditions. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SECTION 13(3) LENDING
FACILITIES, supra note 218, at 36–37, 49–50, 61–62, 74–75, 87–88, 101–03 (describing the
conditions imposed in connection with each of the Fed’s temporary facilities).
265
W. Scott Frame et al., Supervisory Stress Tests, Model Risk, and Model Disclosure:
Lessons from OFHEO 4 (Apr. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/13fmc_gerardi.pdf (discussing the inherent
risks of stress testing, specifically model risk, or the risk of mismeasurement).
266
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SECTION 13(3) LENDING FACILITIES, supra note 218, at
84 (“[I]nvestors [of CDs] may quickly remove their investments, leaving the fund with
insufficient positive cash flow.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures,
Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1197–98 (1988)
(“[CD holders] will demand higher rates of return on these certificates if the stock returns
of the bank with whom they are placing their funds exhibits high volatility—a strong proxy
for risk.” (footnote omitted)).
264
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that much of its deposit base is less sticky than it had anticipated.
And, in an environment where liquidity is scarce, the healthy bank
likely will be compelled to respond, whether by offering higher rates
of interest itself, reducing its lending activity, or otherwise. Increasing
funding costs and reducing the lending activity of healthy banks are
precisely the types of effects that the government seeks to minimize
during crisis periods. Hence, an important reason to seek to prevent
distressed banks from using high interest rates to attract insured deposits is to protect healthy banks from having to compete with banks
facing skewed incentives.
There may also be adverse collateral consequences from banks’
reliance on FHLBank advances as a source of short-term liquidity. Because FHLBank advances are fully collateralized and the FHLBanks
enjoy a statutory super-lien, a bank’s increased reliance on FHLBank
advances will reduce the assets the bank has to cover the claims of
uninsured depositors and other creditors, including the FDIC, should
the bank fail.267 The failure of IndyMac in July 2008 illustrates why
this may be problematic. According to a report by the Office of
Inspector General, a leading cause of IndyMac’s failure was its lack of
core deposits, enabled in significant part by its disproportionately
high level of reliance on FHLBank advances.268 The closure of
IndyMac ultimately cost the FDIC insurance fund approximately $10.7
billion and resulted in significant losses on its uninsured deposits.269
The FHLBank of San Francisco, which had advances outstanding to
IndyMac Bank of $10.1 billion at the time it was closed, was repaid in
full.270 Given everything else that was happening in July 2008 and the
months that followed, it is hard to trace the ramifications of the losses
imposed on uninsured depositors and the FDIC insurance fund, but
there are reasons to be concerned about both. The imposition of
losses on uninsured depositors can make depositors quicker to run
and so increase bank fragility, a consequence that is particularly undesirable in the midst of a financial crisis. Losses to the insurance fund
deplete the resources available to aid depositors of other financial institutions, potentially encouraging regulatory forbearance and increasing the probability that the fund will either need taxpayer
support or be unable to repay insured depositors at other institu-

267

Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 558.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AUDIT REPORT OIG-09-032,
SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS: MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW OF INDYMAC BANK, FSB 9–10 (2009).
269
Id. at 1.
270
Press Release, Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., FDIC Establishes Successor to
IndyMac Bank (July 11, 2008), http://www.fhlbsf.com/about/news/releases/7-11-08-indy
mac-successor.aspx.
268
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tions.271 These risks are particularly great when, as was the case in July
2008, a bank’s failure is but one of many and an insurance fund faces
probable losses in excess of its resources.272
C. Other Consequences
Most of the effects of the operation of the alternative discount
windows identified thus far can relatively easily be categorized as benefits or drawbacks. The operation of the alternative discount windows,
however, also give rise to other issues that may be just as important in
light of our democratic regime but that are not as easily categorized as
wholly positive or negative. This subpart considers three such
consequences.
1. Reduced Transparency
When banks access liquidity through the alternative discount windows, these actions appear to be less salient to the market than borrowing through the Discount Window, and a bank’s use of these
alternative discount windows for liquidity support may never be fully
disclosed. The effects of this reduced transparency are mixed, and
they may depend on the values one seeks to maximize. Prior to the
Crisis, the Fed generally did not make any disclosures regarding loans
it extended through the Discount Window, presumably reflecting the
Fed’s belief that nondisclosure furthered legitimate policy aims, such
as reducing concerns about stigma and encouraging banks to borrow
when it was socially optimal for them to do so.273
At the same time, in response to the Fed’s actions during the
Crisis, Congress changed the law to require the Fed to disclose to
whom it provides funds and on what terms.274 Public disclosure is
delayed to reduce the risk that concerns about stigma and other adverse short-term consequences will deter borrowing, but it is
271
Sharon Stangenes, Regulator: Don’t Forget S&l Insurance Funding, CHI. TRI. (Nov. 23,
1992), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-11-23/business/9204170334_1_federaldeposit-insurance-corp-loan-deposits-thrift-supervision (stating that the “insurance drain
from the savings and loan debacle almost emptied the coffers of the [FDIC]”).
272
BAIR, supra note 113, at 82 (describing the anticipated losses from the closure of
IndyMac and how those losses contributed to the rapid depletion of the insurance fund,
pushing it into “negative territory” in 2009).
273
In response to requests made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
the Fed released detailed information about its lending activities during the Crisis, including loans extended through the Discount Window. See Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 601 F.3d 143 (2d
Cir. 2010) (ruling that the Fed had to release specific information pursuant to FOIA requests made by Bloomberg L.P.).
274
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1103(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2118 (2010) (amending and adding ¶ (s) to 12 U.S.C. § 248
(2012)).
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mandatory in all cases.275 The requirement that all loans eventually
be disclosed despite the potential costs suggests that Congress, and
the public, desire more openness about these matters. Particularly
considering that the provision of liquidity can have significant distributional effects, even if the aim is to promote the overall stability of
the financial system, the desire for more transparency and the discourse it enables may be appropriate.276 In this light, banks’ capacity
to access government-backed liquidity in less transparent ways may be
viewed as compromising this legitimate aim.
2. Reduced Accountability
Closely related to reduced transparency is reduced accountability; for similar reasons, the ramifications are likely to be mixed. On
the one hand, accountability is core to a functional democratic regime, and creating mechanisms to hold financial regulators accountable for their actions, including the provision of liquidity, is one of the
major themes in the Dodd-Frank Act.277 On the other hand, accountability to the public and elected officials can impede effective policymaking. That these interests sometimes compete is well recognized
and is one of the reasons for the extreme independence that the Fed
currently enjoys.278
The decisions implicit in the Dodd-Frank Act to allow the Fed to
continue to serve as the lender of last resort and, for the most part, to
allow the Fed to maintain its exceptional degree of independence
mean that the Fed can still provide liquidity to banks and other
financial institutions even when public opinion weighs strongly
against such activity.279 But the Fed is not immune from public pressure. And, Congress has more than once narrowed the Fed’s
lender-of-last-resort authority when it has been used in ways that
proved politically unpopular.280 Thus, concerns about public perceptions or political backlash may cause the Fed to alter its actions, including by reducing the liquidity transfers it makes, in ways that may
not be socially optimal.
275

12 U.S.C. § 248(s)(2).
Judge, Soft Constraints, supra note 54.
277
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376, pmbl. (2010) (stating that the Act’s purpose is “[t]o promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability . . . in the financial
system”).
278
See Judge, Soft Constraints, supra note 54.
279
See Cooley et al., supra note 60, at 64 (stating that “the Fed is widely viewed as
among the most independent of government agencies” and that “the Dodd-Frank bill does
not materially alter this reality”).
280
See supra Part I.B.
276
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At the same time, at least some segments of the American public
clearly believe that far greater accountability is warranted.281 A lack of
public trust in financial institutions and those that regulate them can
have troubling long-term consequences, and limited accountability
may perpetuate such distrust.282 Ultimately, there is no easy answer to
the question of how accountable a lender of last resort should be.
Perhaps the only thing that can be said with certainty is that the operation of the alternative discount windows reduces transparency and the
capacity for Congress or the public to hold any single regulator accountable for decisions to provide banks access to government-backed
liquidity.
3. Reduced Coordination and Control
The final issue worth highlighting is closely related to the other
two—when a bank has multiple avenues for accessing governmentbacked liquidity, coordination challenges arise and the Fed enjoys less
leverage in its role as lender of last resort. This can have real costs,
such as reducing the Fed’s access to information and its ability to impose information-generating conditions on loans.283 But, it may also
have real benefits. The Fed has at times been excessively hesitant to
provide banks access to liquidity, and that hesitancy can inflict real
damage on the economy.284 The alternative discount windows cannot
fully compensate for such stinginess, but they do have the capacity to
mitigate its effects. Framed more broadly, greater centralization and
control tend to facilitate more effective policymaking, but efficacy is
not a good thing when the policies being pursued are wrong.
V
IMPLICATIONS
This Part addresses implications. It first addresses why reform is
warranted and ways to change the programs giving rise to the alternative discount windows to reduce the tendency for banks, particularly
troubled banks, to use each in lieu of going to the Fed. It then considers the importance of further study on the role that a lender of last
resort should play in a modern financial system.
281
See RON PAUL, END THE FED 141–48 (2009) (discussing how the Fed’s “destructive
nature makes it a tool of tyrannical government”).
282
Mark J. Roe, Capital Markets and Financial Politics: Preferences and Institutions, 7 CAPITALISM & SOC’Y, art. 3, at 3, 5–7 (2012) (“Simply put, if a nation’s polity does not support a
strong capital market, that nation will not have a strong capital market.”).
283
See supra Part IV.B.4.
284
See supra notes 227–76 and accompanying text.
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A. Alternative Discount Windows
One response to the dynamics revealed here would be to allow
the alternative discount windows to continue to function in their current forms. Their operation likely increases the net transfer of
government-backed liquidity into banks during times of financial distress, does so in a way that avoids the stigma of the Discount Window,
and potentially gives rise to other benefits. Moreover, there are some
constraints inherent in each of the alternative discount windows, limiting the degree to which banks can rely on them to circumvent market
discipline or avoid the Discount Window. Only members of the
FHLBank System can access advances, and a bank’s access to advances
is constrained by the bank’s ability to provide eligible collateral. Similarly, the process of attracting insured deposits takes time and effort in
addition to a willingness to pay higher rates.
While these benefits are real, they are likely outweighed by the
costs and other drawbacks of maintaining the current regime. The
historical operation of the alternative discount windows makes clear
that they are used—and are likely to continue to be used—disproportionately by troubled banks. Their operation can adversely affect
healthy banks and it reduces transparency and accountability at a time
when public will is pushing in the opposite direction. Moreover, the
aim need not be, and as a practical matter cannot be, to shut down
these alternatives entirely. This subpart accordingly considers ways
that the identified drawbacks may be lessened and regulatory accountability increased by modifying the underlying programs. In light of
the different costs associated with each alternative discount window
and the very different aims each program is meant to otherwise
achieve, the responses look quite different.
1. Federal Home Loan Banks
The questions surrounding whether the FHLBank System sufficiently serves legitimate policy aims to justify the costs of its operations
complicate the issue of how best to address the more narrow set of
policy issues raised here. This section accordingly offers a range of
possible interventions, starting with one narrowly tailored to the issues
here at stake and concluding with an approach that would address the
more fundamental questions surrounding the FHLBanks’ ongoing
operations.
a. Communication
At the very minimum, there should be a closer working relationship between the FHLBanks and the Fed. Currently, there appears to
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be little formal or informal communication between these entities.285
The FHLBanks have access to confidential information regarding the
Fed’s assessments of the banks it supervises, as it can only lend to
banks that have received an adequate rating from their primary
regulator, but there is little indication of information flowing in the
other direction.286 Moreover, each pursues its agenda largely independent of the other.287 To the extent that banks are relying on
FHLBank advances in lieu of the Discount Window when facing liquidity constraints, this is problem.
An initial step could be to establish formal lines of communication whereby the FHLBanks provide the Fed updates regarding banks’
borrowing patterns, the terms of the advances banks are receiving,
and the collateral they are posting. Because banks rely on FHLBank
advances for a variety of funding purposes other than meeting
short-term liquidity needs, this could result in a deluge of information
that is of limited utility to the Fed. Accordingly, it may be appropriate
for the amount of information conveyed to vary, increasing when
there is reason to suspect that a particular bank is using FHLBank
advances to meet liquidity needs or when the system as a whole is
under strain. For example, the FHLBanks could be required to provide more granular information when (1) member banks of an
FHLBank collectively increase their use of advances by a notable margin within a finite time frame, such as 5% within a one-week period or
10% within a one-month period; (2) an individual bank significantly
increases its reliance on FHLBank advances in a relatively short time
frame, such as 10% within a one-week period or 15% in any onemonth period; or (3) the Fed requests additional information. A variety of other trigger structures are also possible. The aim is to balance
excessive information flow and the costs of conveying that information with the value of ensuring that the Fed learns of relevant changes
in banks’ reliance on FHLBank advances and has access to detailed
information about banks’ use of FHBank advances when appropriate.
b. Intermediate Steps
A second and somewhat more aggressive reform would give a regulator that is more accountable to the public, and that has better incentives, some degree of control over banks’ access to FHLBank
285
See Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 580 (outlining how the Fed and FHLBanks
“complemented and competed” with each other during the financial crisis); Investor Relations, supra note 186 (noting that each FHLBank is a “separate entity, with its own board of
directors, management, and employees”).
286
See Federal Home Loan Bank System: Lending and Collateral Q&A, FHLBANKS OFF. FIN.
1 (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.fhlb-of.com/ofweb_userWeb/resources/lendingqanda.pdf
(stating that membership to an FHLBank “is limited to regulated depository institutions”).
287
See Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 580.
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advances. With respect to the issues discussed here, the Fed is one
obvious candidate. It may be appropriate, for example, to authorize
the Fed to limit the rate at which banks can increase their reliance on
FHLBank advances under certain circumstances, like those outlined
above. A default rule that a bank cannot increase its use of FHLBank
advances by more than a set amount in a specified period of time
without permission from the Fed could achieve this. Increased
reliance could also trigger other rights or obligations, such as giving
the Fed increased rights of access to information about a bank’s financial condition and access to senior personnel.
It may also be possible to address many of the costs associated
with banks’ reliance on FHLBank advances to meet liquidity needs by
increasing the authority of a different federal regulator, namely, the
FDIC. The FDIC has less of a role in promoting systemic stability than
the Fed, and it would not be as well positioned as the Fed to consider
interactions between banks’ use of FHLBank advances and other
mechanisms for banks to access government-backed liquidity. Yet, because FHLBank advances can increase FDIC losses when a bank fails,
the FDIC is incented to limit the capacity of troubled banks to access
FHLBank advances when they are likely to use the funds so received
to assume excessive risks. Additionally, if an institution is solvent, the
FDIC would like it to remain so, so the FDIC has little incentive to
overly restrict banks’ ability to use FHLBank advances in appropriate
circumstances. The type of authority to give the FDIC would be similar to that proposed for the Fed. The triggers might need to be modified, and likely should be based on the total advances outstanding
relative to a bank’s assets or other relevant measure, but the aim
would be similar—giving a financial regulator, experienced in bank
oversight and incentivized to limit the ability of financially distressed
banks to access advances, greater authority to determine if that is occurring and to take preventative steps in response.
Ultimately, the question of whether to give this type of authority
to the Fed, the FDIC, or some combination thereof depends on the
extent to which the aim is to address the capacity of banks to use
FHLBank advances in lieu of the Discount Window or to go further
and address some of the other inefficiencies inherent in the current
FHLBank System. The Fed is likely better suited to the first task, while
the FDIC is more likely to also take on the latter responsibility.
c. Reexamine the FHLBank System
All of the reforms proposed thus far could reduce banks’ use of
FHLBank advances. Because advances are the core business of the
FHLBanks, this may adversely affect their ability to achieve the aims
for which they were created. The extent of interference, however, de-
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pends on the extent to which the FHLBanks and their business of
providing advances continues to achieve the aim of helping homeowners access loans. The data available raises significant questions
about their efficacy in this regard.288 Moreover, while the FHLBanks
also play other roles, providing advances remains their core function.
Hence, another way to address the issues raised here would be to do
so in conjunction with a more thorough analysis of whether and how
to reform the FHLBank System to ensure it remains a socially useful
program. Particularly considering the fact that the RefCorp bonds
were paid off in full in 2011289 and the recognized need to reform the
other GSEs, this may be an appropriate time to fundamentally rethink
the System’s existence and function.
2. Insured Deposits
Deposits present a different challenge. There was and always will
be a relationship between deposit insurance and a lender of last resort. By making depositors less inclined to run, deposit insurance
reduces the likelihood that banks will face a liquidity shortage that
necessitates borrowing from a lender of last resort. But there is a difference between making deposits more sticky in general and enabling
banks to retain and attract liquidity when facing financial distress. A
deposit insurance scheme should seek to achieve the former while
limiting the latter.
Because one of the primary social costs arising from banks’ efforts
to attract deposits by offering exceptionally high interest rates is the
risk that other banks will lose deposits or be forced to offer artificially
inflated rates, this should be the focus of any regulatory response.
One response could be to provide the FDIC with a more meaningful
check on banks’ interest-rate policies and to have the FDIC institute a
meaningful system for monitoring and limiting such behavior. Reforms along these lines were adopted in the wake of the S&L debacle
to address the challenge as it was then understood and could be extended further in light of the ways that troubled banks retained and
attracted insured deposits during the Crisis.290
The current regime failed to prevent financially distressed banks
from using aggressive interest rates to retain and attract funds despite
earlier reforms because those reforms targeted brokered deposits and
relied on a bank’s CAMELS rating and capitalization to signal whether
the bank was troubled.291 As reflected in the findings from Acharya
288

See supra Part II.A.1.
See Press Release, supra note 173.
290
See Moysich, supra note 136, at 187–88.
291
See 12 U.S.C. § 1831f (2012) and rules promulgated thereunder; The Federal Reserve
Discount Window, supra note 67.
289
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and Mora, however, banks now use the lure of higher interest rates to
retain and attract deposits directly, not just through brokers.292 More
importantly, the Crisis made clear that a bank’s CAMELS rating and
capitalization are poor leading indicators of whether a bank is likely to
fail, and many of the troubled banks that used interest rates to retain
and attract insured deposits could not have been identified using
these metrics.293 This suggests that the FDIC likely should have more
authority than it currently enjoys to intervene in a bank’s interest-rate
policies. At the same time, reverting to Regulation Q or giving free
reign to the FDIC to limit the interest rates that a bank may pay on
insured deposits would be an overreaction to the issues identified and
could give rise to other costly distortions.
These interests can be balanced by providing the FDIC with the
authority to intervene but only under specific conditions. In particular, it may be appropriate to allow the FDIC to intervene, perhaps in
the form of a veto, when a bank seeks to offer an interest rate that is
excessively high relative to that being offered by peer institutions or
prevailing market rates. For example, the FDIC could impose a default rule allowing it to veto a bank’s proposed interest-rate policy
when the interest rates the bank seeks to offer deviate by more than a
set number of basis points and a set number of standard deviations
from the mean interest rate for that type of account. Because the triggers authorizing intervention would be established by interest rates
currently offered at other institutions, such a regime should not introduce the types of distortions associated with earlier government efforts to limit interest rates. Such reforms should both reduce banks’
ability to use insured deposits attracted or retained with high interest
rates as a substitute for the Discount Window and limit the adverse
effects that a troubled bank’s efforts to attract and retain deposits
would have on healthy institutions.
B. Future Study
In addition to suggesting the need to reform the FHLBank
System and the deposit insurance scheme, this Article draws attention
to the many unanswered questions regarding the role that a lender of
last resort can and should play in a modern financial system. The
value of a lender of last resort is well recognized and has only been
reaffirmed by recent events. Yet the Crisis, and the Fed’s responses to
it, illustrate that the Discount Window is poorly suited to respond to
many of the liquidity shortages that can plague a modern financial
292

See supra Part II.A.2.
See BAIR, supra note 113, at 78–79 (stating that the list of “troubled banks” kept by
the FDIC, based on their CAMELS ratings, was misleading and did not reflect the true
health of the industry).
293
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system. By being creative and aggressive in how it interpreted its authority, the Fed was able to respond to many of the liquidity shortages
that arose, but there are reasons to question whether the Fed’s actions, even if defensible under the circumstances, were optimal.
Moreover, the Fed’s authority under section 13(3) has been narrowed
subsequent to the Crisis, making it more difficult, and in some cases
impossible, for it to take the same actions it took during the Crisis
should it face similar dynamics in the future.294 This suggests at least
two lines of inquiry that merit further study: (1) the appropriate scope
of authority to grant a modern-day lender of last resort, and (2) the
principled norms that should guide how the lender of last resort exercises that authority.
The analysis here reveals that much of the Fed’s creativity in setting up temporary liquidity facilities stemmed from changes in banking and the financial system more generally. The dramatic
transformation in the nature of banking and the rise of the shadow
banking system have fundamentally transformed the financial landscape and therefore changed the nature of the support the Fed reasonably believed it had to provide in order to help avert systemic
collapse. As other commentators have recognized, however, there is a
significant difference between a standing facility like the Discount
Window and a temporary facility that the Fed can only establish after
publicly declaring the existence of “unusual and exigent” circumstances and satisfying other requirements.295 Temporary facilities cannot provide the same general assurance to the market, reducing their
capacity to prevent runs, and the very process of declaring that the
conditions of section 13(3) are satisfied may alarm the same market
participants that the Fed seeks to calm. It may, accordingly, be appropriate to study whether the Fed’s authority to set up standing facilities
should continue to be limited to the authority granted pursuant to
section 10B, the basis for the Discount Window, or whether it should
be expanded in light of changes in the financial system.
Just as important as the changes in the financial system that have
occurred thus far are those that have yet to come. The financial system has proven remarkably dynamic, changing in response to regulation, technological improvements, and other innovations.296 There is
little sign that this dynamism will slow in the years ahead. Central to
the ability of the Fed to respond to unforeseen changes in the markets
over the course of the Crisis was the breadth of the discretion it
294
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1101, 124 Stat. 1376, 2113 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)) (limiting
the Fed’s authority to extend loans under section 13(3)).
295
See, e.g., Dudley, supra note 24.
296
See, e.g., Judge, Fragmentation Nodes, supra note 84, 669–84 (discussing the creation
and innovation of mortgage-backed securities).
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possessed under section 13(3) in its earlier incarnation. Hence, the
analysis here also raises questions about whether the revised regime
provides the Fed sufficient flexibility to respond to the myriad
liquidity shortages that might arise in today’s, and tomorrow’s, financial system.297
That the authority granted to the Fed to serve as lender of last
resort may be too narrow, when viewed solely in terms of maximizing
the probability that the Fed will have the authority it needs to calm
financial markets and address liquidity shortages, does not resolve the
accountability issues that contributed to Congress’s decision to narrow
the Fed’s authority under section 13(3). Transparency and accountability typically serve as cornerstones in establishing legitimacy, and
there are no easy answers with respect to how to reconcile the tensions
that arise when these aims conflict with other policy goals.298 One
tool that has helped to reduce this conflict in the context of the Fed’s
role as lender of last resort is the existence of a robust set of norms
about when and to whom a lender of last resort should lend.299 Soft
constraints, like principled norms, can play this role by providing a set
of guidelines that both shape Fed policy and provide a benchmark
that others, including Congress and the public, can use to hold the
Fed accountable. The challenge is that the most commonly invoked
maxims still date back to Bagehot’s admonitions from 1873, a time
when the financial system looked very different from how it does today.300 And, as the analysis here has shown, those changes in the system create new questions and challenges for a lender of last resort. A
related challenge, also reflected in the analysis here, is that scholars
and policymakers have learned a lot since Bagehot’s time, and the
297
Other scholars and policymakers have also started to ask questions along these
lines. See, e.g., Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 17, at 417; Dudley, supra note 24.
298
There is a body of literature, primarily by economists, examining the tension between the demands of a democratic regime and the high degree of independence that
economic theory and empirical studies suggest a central bank should enjoy. However, the
focus is generally on the role of central banks in setting monetary policy, and this literature
examines, without fully resolving, that underlying tension. See generally Rosa M. Lastra &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Central Bank Independence in Ordinary and Extraordinary Times, in CENTRAL
BANK INDEPENDENCE: THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (Jan Kleineman ed., 2001) (outlining the benefits and costs
of having an independent central bank); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies International Conference: Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability (May
25, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke
20100525a.htm (arguing for central bank independence while also discussing the need for
transparency and accountability).
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Judge, Soft Constraints, supra note 54, at 1–2.
300
NEIL IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS: THREE CENTRAL BANKERS AND A WORLD ON FIRE 28
(2013) (“At the 2009 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City conference in Jackson Hole,
where contemporary central bankers gather every August, Bagehot’s name was mentioned
forty-eight times.”).
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lessons subsequently learned are necessarily missing from his teachings.301 Hence, this Article also supports the need for further study
regarding the norms that should govern action by a lender of last resort and whether such norms should vary depending on the nature of
the liquidity shortage that the lender of last resort is seeking to
address.
These two inquiries are, of course, intricately related, and they
are also interconnected with the core issue here of whether and to
what extent the alternative discount windows should be closed. For
example, so long as the alternative discount windows remain open,
imposing additional disclosure requirements on the Fed will only partially satisfy demands to know what banks are relying on governmentbacked liquidity and to what extent. Similarly, the availability of alternative mechanisms for accessing government-backed liquidity may alter the optimal role that the Fed should play in this regard. The aim
here is not to resolve these difficult issues but to draw attention to
their fundamental importance and the failure of much of the literature to keep up with recent developments.
CONCLUSION
Banks today have access to three distinct standing sources of
government-backed liquidity. This is not a system that Congress, or
anyone, intended to create. Like many inadvertent regimes, this one
has some benefits. But it also gives rise to significant costs and other
consequences like reduced transparency and accountability. When
values beyond welfare maximization are at stake, there is no easy
formula for determining the optimal response, and this Article does
not purport to provide one. Nonetheless, in drawing attention to the
existence and operation of the alternative discount windows, identifying the myriad effects of their operation, and proposing some responses, this Article serves as an important starting point for
discussion about whether and how the programs giving rise to the alternative discount windows should be modified in light of their mixed
effects.

301
See generally Freixas et al., Since Bagehot, supra note 36 (describing many of the lessons learned since Bagehot’s time).
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